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ABSTRACT 
THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SELF-IMMOLATION 
AS A TACTIC OF POLITICAL PROTEST IN INDIA AND SOUTH KOREA 
Sean Goff 
April 19,2013 
In recent years, self-immolation has become a pervasive tactic of political protest. 
To this point, however, it has been unclear why self-immolation has become so widely 
employed, calling into question the social and political efficacy of the tactic. The 
purpose of this thesis is to determine self-immolation's impact on three target groups: the 
core, the periphery, and the political system. In doing so, I conduct a comparative study 
ofIndia's anti-reservation movement and South Korea's prodemocracy movement, both 
of which experienced high frequencies of self-immolation. I demonstrate that while self-
immolation was ineffective at mobilizing the core and only moderately effective at 
mobilizing the periphery and initiating political change, in South Korea, self-immolation 
was highly effective on all three groups. I argue that the differences in efficacy can be 
attributed to variations in social structure, political culture, issue diffusion, and 
institutional access to the political system. 
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For Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit and vegetable vender in the town of Sidi Bouzid, 
Tunisia, December 19,2010 began like any other day. A college graduate, Bouazizi 
turned to street vending to support his family during times of severe Tunisian 
unemployment. In doing so, he had become familiar with the harassment and 
shakedowns that were common from police and state officials. However, on this 
occasion, the harassment went too far. Bouazizi was approached by government officials 
and solicited for bribes. When he refused, he was beaten and his inventory and 
equipment were confiscated. In an attempt to redress his grievances, Bouazizi went to 
the local municipal building to file a complaint and retrieve his property. However, he 
was turned away without an audience. For the disgruntled street vender, this was merely 
another injustice emblematic of the severe corruption within the system. Bouazizi 
decided to make a public statement that could not be ignored. In an act of protest, he 
returned to the municipal building, doused himself in flammable liquid, and set himself 
on fire. Upon hearing news of the incident, outraged crowds of protesters spontaneously 
poured into the street of Tunisia leading to violent conflict with authorities. Within three 
weeks, civil unrest had erupted in both Egypt and Algeria. By the one year anniversary 
of the self-immolation, protests had taken place in 17 countries throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa, and regime change had occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. 
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The political magnitude of the events that unfolded during what many have 
dubbed the "Arab Spring" is undeniable. For decades, authoritarian regimes have had a 
virtual monopoly on power in the region. In an almost unprecedented popular response 
to perceived political injustices in the Arab world, masses of citizens rose up collectively 
to challenge their oppressors. 
The self-immolation of Bouazizi, while horrific and unconscionable to most, is 
certainly not an isolated event. If we look closely., we can find accounts of self-
immolation scattered throughout history, some dating back thousands of years. Prior to 
the 1960s, self-immolation was often a type of ritualistic behavior, committed in 
accordance with the norms and values of society. For instance, it was common for 
individuals to commit suicide, often times in extreme and theatrical ways in order to 
fulfill socially prescribed responsibilities, such as the demonstration of familial loyalty or 
the restoration of honor within a community. Another common practice, typically 
associated with Buddhism, was the sacrifice of one's life in the name of spiritual 
devotion and asceticism. However, since 1963 when Thich Quang Duc self-immolated in 
full view of thousands of observers and international media, the practice has become an 
ever-present method of political protest (Biggs, 2005; Crosby, Rhee, & Holland, 1977; H. 
Kim, 2008). Although Crosby et ai. prematurely observed in 1977 that self-immolation is 
"yielding to more aggressive acts of terrorism as popular methods of forcing political 
change," (Crosby, et aI., 1977, p. 68) the world has witnessed an increase in frequency of 
epidemic proportions, particularly in recent years. Furthermore, self-immolation appears 
unconfined by geographic boundaries, cultural norms, or demographic characteristics. 
Self-immolations have occurred in almost every part ofthe world, and have been 
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committed by a variety of people, regardless of gender, political ideology, religious 
affiliation, education, age, or economic status (Biggs, 2005). 
Despite its apparent universality and political significance, self-immolation has 
yet to become a fashionable topic in the study of political science. Contemporary 
political science deals almost exclusively with politics in an institutional context, 
primarily focusing on the structures and functions of governments, and how individuals 
and collective groups behave within the framework of institutional processes (i.e. voting 
behavior or interest groups). It typically ignores extra-institutional political activity, 
such as protest or, to use Sidney Tarrow's terminology, contentious politics (Tarrow, 
1998). For Tarrow, arguably the only political scientist currently taken seriously by the 
academic community in the study of collective action, contentious politics is an act that is 
"used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or 
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or 
authorities" (Tarrow, 1998, p. 3). Tarrow's notion of contentious politics is particularly 
relevant to this study for two reasons. First, it removes the assumption that politics is 
necessarily institutional. The fact is that the social and political spheres are not mutually 
exclusive, and contentious politics is a manifestation of the interactive dynamic between 
the two. Thus, the social and the political spheres cannot be separated without sacrificing 
elements essential to understanding extra-institutional political behavior. Second, self-
immolation is a form of contentious politics, albeit an extreme form, because it is an act 
of the powerless used to express or remedy a political grievance by contesting an 
institutional political authority. This struggle by a social actor in opposition to an 
institutional entity or actor is what I refer to as cotmter-institutional action. 
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The primary objective of this work is to explore the role of self-immolation in the 
interaction between the social and political structures. This extreme form of protest is a 
social phenomenon because the immolator is operating outside of the legitimate political 
processes, and often influences the actions of non-political actors. But, the immolator 
also has a political agenda - to express a political grievance, to influence the actions of 
political actors, or both. There is a socio-political structural overlap not only because 
self-immolation can simultaneously have social and political consequences, but also 
because the social effects can indirectly have a political impact. In other words, it can 
serve a mobilizing function, influencing political change that the act would not have 
achieved on its own. The central question here, however, is how effective is this tactic? 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine th{~ social and political efficacy of self-
immolation, specifically the ability of the act to induce social mobilization and changes in 
the structure and behavior of the political system. In doing so, I will conduct a 
comparative study between two socio-political movements in recent history that are 
associated with mass instances of self-immolation: the anti-reservation movement in 
India and the prodemocracy movement in South Korea. Specifically, I will look at the 
impacts of self-immolation on three distinct groups: the core community/activists (those 
who do or will experience the adverse effects of a particular political action or condition, 
and who can expect to benefit from changing such an action or condition); the peripheral 
community/general public (those who will either not benefit from political change, or 
who view the benefits as unimportant);l and the primary political target (those whose 
1 It should be noted that there may be some instances in which there may be multiple audiences. Tibetan 
Monks, for example, might target both the Tibetan and Chinese general publics. However, the responses of 
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behavior is the cause of the grievance).2 I argue that both countries were moderately 
open, conceptually falling between a closed autocratic system and a fully open 
democratic system. In other words, at the time of the self-immolations and respective 
movements, both India and South Korea were experiencing conditions of socio-political 
liberalization. However, the effects of the self-immolations on social mobilization and 
political change in each case were drastically different. On the one hand, India's anti-
reservation movement experienced almost no effects in terms of core mobilization, 
limited effects on peripheral mobilization, and only modest, short-term political change. 
The prodemocracy movement in South Korea, on the other hand, experienced significant 
effects on all three groups. I contend that this disparity is attributable to variance in 
social structure, political culture and values, issue diffusion, and institutional access to 
the political system. While India is a stratified social system based on a long history of 
caste and class distinction, South Korea is an integrated and largely homogenous society. 
The social dynamics in these two countries have resulted in corresponding political 
cultures. In India, social stratification has promoted a political culture of frustration and 
social animosity, sometimes leading to caste/class related violence.3 South Korea has 
developed a communitarian political culture that promotes the values of cooperation and 
sacrifice of the individual for the good of the whole. Furthermore, while the issue of anti-
reservation held practical importance for only a small segment ofIndian society, 
democratic reform in South Korea held practical implications for all. Finally, the 
these two targets would understandably be very different. While it is important to acknowledge such a 
distinction, detailing the nuances of target audiences is beyond the scope of this research. 
2 Throughout the body of this work, I will use certain terms such as core and activists, or periphery and 
general public interchangeably for stylistic purposes. 
3 India's social structure consists of four casted groups that together contain thousands of distinct classes, 
and one un-casted group commonly referred to as Dalit. 
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political/institutional context has considerable influence on the way self-immolation is 
perceived. In other words, the degree of institutional access largely determines whether 
or not society and political actors will identify and empathize with the self-immolator. In 
systems with little or no access, people tend to rally around the self-immolator, thus 
promoting social cohesion and group identity, because it is understood to be an act of the 
desperate, as opposed to an act of the disturbed or maladjusted, which is the case in 
systems which a high degree of institutional access. 
The structure of this work will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will provide 
the reader with an understanding of self-immolation, as well as the methodological 
approach I use in this study. I will begin with a survey of the existing literature on self-
immolation, which will highlight current methodological weaknesses and identify areas 
that have, thus far, been unaddressed. Next, I will outline a conceptual definition of self-
immolation by distinguishing it from other types of socially and politically related 
suicide. Specifically, I define self-immolation as a politically motivated act, committed 
in opposition to a legitimate institutional political authority, and in which death is the 
primary objective. Following the conceptual definition, I will discuss pertinent 
contributions to the theory of collective action, including rational cost-benefit analysis 
(Olson, 1965), the theory of the "critical mass" (Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Oliver, 
Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985), opportunities in the political structure (Tarrow, 1998), and 
the selection and application of protest tactics (Della Porta & Diani, 1999; McAdam & 
Tarrow, 2000; Oberschall, 1970). I will then briefly describe the methodological 
approach of this study, the processes of data collection and analysis, operational 
definitions of efficacy and political openness, and certain unavoidable limitations of this 
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approach. In Chapter 3, I will present the reader with a discussion of the anti-reservation 
movement in India and the prodemocracy movement in South Korea. In this chapter, I 
will first demonstrate that these movements occurred during periods of socio-political 
liberalization in both countries making these two cases appropriate for comparison. I will 
then continue with a description the events, as well as the social and political 
circumstances surrounding each movement. I will devote Chapter 4 to a comparative 
analysis, focusing on the effects of self-immolation on the core, the periphery, and the 
political target, in each case respectively. Specifically, I will look at the organization, 
structure, actions, and political outcomes of each movement. In Chapter 5, I will discuss 
why each of the previously mentioned socio-political variables dramatically influenced 
the efficacy of self-immolation as a tactic of political protest. In the last Chapter, I will 
summarize the conclusions of this thesis, discuss (:ertain limitations and difficulties I 
encountered throughout the course of this research, and propose ideas for future research 
on this topic. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
Although the phenomenon of self-immolation is increasing at an apparently 
exponential rate throughout the world, as we shall see, there have been only limited 
attempts at studying it. Those scholars who have addressed the issue, have frequently 
come to different conclusions, partly due to methodological and conceptual discontinuity. 
In the following sections, I will outline self-immolation in the current academic literature, 
offer a conceptual definition of self-immolation, and discuss the methods of this study, 
including operational definitions and measurements of mobilization and political change. 
Self-immolation in the Literature 
To date, the study of self-immolation has scarcely been addressed by scholars 
outside the field of psychiatry. As a consequence, the most ubiquitous explanations are 
derived from studying the act itself or from within the framework of individual 
motivations. Some, for example, have argued that self-immolators suffer from 
psychopathological disorders, such as depression, substance abuse, and schizophrenia, 
and are, therefore, psychologically predisposed to Icommit suicide (Ashton & Donnan, 
1981; Geller, 1997; Rothschild, Raatschen, & Schneider, 2001). In a study of suicide by 
fire in the United States between 1965 and 1994, Geller found that "the distribution of 
psychopathology does not appear to differentiate self-incinerators from those who 
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attempt or complete suicide by other means" (Geller, 1997, p. 369). Likewise, Ashton 
and Donnan found that, of the 82 cases of suicide by fire that occurred in the United 
Kingdom between 1978 and 1979, none appeared to be politically motivated and the 
majority had histories of mental illness (Ashton & Donnan, 1981). Rothschild, 
Raatschen, and Schneider echoed this claim in a study of self-immolations that occurred 
in Berlin between 1990 and 2000. Out of 46 cases, they identified only two that were 
politically motivated (Rothschild, et aI., 2001). At first glance, it would appear that self-
immolations are merely random acts caused by mental disturbances. However, if we 
look more closely we will see that these scholars adopt very broad definitions of self-
immolation. They define self-immolation in terms of the act itself, rather the empirical 
conditions under which the act occurred (H. Kim, 2008). Ashton and Donnan, for 
instance, included "all persons in England and Wales whose death certificates mentioned 
suicide or suspicious death by burning" (Ashton & Donnan, 1981, p. 736). Employing an 
equally expansive definition, Geller identifies self· immolation simply as "intentionally 
setting oneself on fire" (Geller, 1997, p. 355). For Rothschild et aI., self-immolations 
include "deliberately setting oneself on fire and thereby sustaining burns covering 2% or 
more of the body surface area" (Rothschild, et aI., 2001, p. 163). As we can see, such 
broad conceptual definitions encompass a variety of suicidal acts, and thus fail to identify 
political suicide as a distinct type. Biggs highlights this problem stating that many 
"studies by psychologists and psychiatrists defined their subject as self-inflicted death by 
fire, thus including personal suicide" (Biggs, 2005, p. 174). 
A study by Crosby, Rhee, and Holland (1977) represents one of the first to 
acknowledge a political dimension of self-immolation. They found that the frequency of 
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self-immolations increased by 250 percent between the periods of 1790-1962 and 1963-
71 (Crosby, et aI., 1977). The authors also found that many occurrences during the latter 
period were indeed instances of political protest (Crosby, et aI., 1977). Similarly, 
however, Crosby et ai. do not draw a distinction between political motivations and mental 
illness, and instead suggest that political motivations do not necessarily preclude 
psychopathological factors (Crosby, et aI., 1977). For them, self-immolation may be 
exclusively politically motivated, exclusively a product of psychopathology, or on rare 
occasions, a combination of the two in varying degrees. 
By situating self-immolation, at least partially, into a political context, Crosby et 
ai. take a major step toward a more nuanced understanding of this extreme form of 
protest. Where they fail, however, is that they continue to classify and compare cases 
that are dissimilar. Like their colleagues in the field of psychiatry, they bundle together 
acts of political protest with instances of suicide. They include political circumstances 
as motivating variables, rather than as defining characteristics. As Kalleberg 
appropriately observes, in order for two concepts to be compared, they "must already 
have been shown to be of the same class (Kalleberg, 1966, p. 81). The fact is that, 
although these acts may appear similar on the surtlce, suicide and suicide protest are not 
of the same class, regardless of how the act was carried out. In treating these events as if 
they are the same, these authors erroneously construct an inappropriate system of 
classification, which renders the conclusions drawn from comparisons useless. 
If we were to reverse the situation, we can easily illustrate the absurdity of such 
conclusions. Let us imagine a situation in which a political scientist concluded that a 
suicide that occurred in a psychiatric ward must have been a political protest, simply 
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because it was a suicide by fire. Failure to acknowledge and discriminate based on the 
environmental circumstances leads one to consider irrelevant data. As it happens, suicide 
is "among the three leading causes of death among those aged 15-44 years in some 
countries, and the second leading cause of death in the 10-24 years age group," which 
translates to "one death every 40 seconds" or approximately one million annual suicides 
worldwide (WHO, 2012). It is reasonable to assume that if we sample from a population 
of total suicides, we are going to be left with a sample that over-represents 
psychopathological variables and under-represents socio-political variables. To 
reemphasize, incorrect definitions lead to fallacious classifications and comparisons. In 
order to properly classify and compare self-immolation, it must not be identified as an act 
that may sometimes be politically motivated; self-immolation, as an effective 
comparative concept, must always be politically motivated. Otherwise it is merely 
another form of elaborate suicide. 
Other studies have strayed away from the psychopathological explanation, but 
continue to approach self-immolation from an individual context. In doing so, they 
concentrate their attention on demographic risk factors (Ahmadi et aI., 2009; 
Alaghehbandan, Lari, Joghataei, & Islami, 2011; Poeschla, Combs, Livingstone, Romm, 
& Klein, 2011). One study, for example, suggests that those who are the first or last 
born, and those without children are statistically at a greater risk of committing self-
immolation (Ahmadi, et aI., 2009). Others have pointed to marital status, urban or rural 
residency, and conflict within the family as factors of importance (Alaghehbandan, et aI., 
2011). Still, others have suggested an economic link to self-immolation, arguing that 
there is a correlation between instances of self-immolation and the level of economic 
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affluence of the country in which the act occurred. In less economically prosperous 
countries, the frequency of self-immolation is much higher than in wealthier countries 
(Poeschla, et aI., 2011). 
While studies that focus on demographic risk factors (Ahmadi, et aI., 2009; 
Alaghehbandan, et ai., 2011; Poeschla, et ai., 201 ll) are not without merit and certainly 
should not be dismissed as irrelevant to the study of self-immolation as a form of political 
protest, they share the same problems of definition and classification as studies that 
advance the psychopathological approach. Namely, these studies fail to distinguish 
between acts of protest and cases that are nothing more than instances of suicide. 
Although demographic variables may increase the likelihood of a politically aggrieved 
individual committing self-immolation, they are not the cause. These studies contribute 
little to the understanding of self-immolation in a socio-political context. Furthermore, 
many of the demographic variables cited likely indicate spurious relationships. For 
example, those in rural areas may be more likely to be politically alienated, single 
individuals might be more active in the community, and self-immolations may occur less 
frequently in developed countries not because of wealth, but because wealthy countries 
tend to be more politically open. We might there:Dore extrapolate that demographic 
variables are more than just risk factors; they might actually be indicators of broader 
socio-political conditions that contribute to extreme forms of protest. 
A study by Singh and colleagues was one of the first to select cases solely on the 
basis of a political issue. In looking at a group of 22 students in India who self-
immolated in response to a policy of reserving educational and employment opportunities 
for members oflower castes (one of the cases se1el~ted for this study), the authors 
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concluded that nearly all of their subjects were exclusively motivated by a common 
political experience (S. P. Singh, Santosh, A vasthi, & Kulhara, 1998). They write that 
"With the exception of one subject, our study group did not show any psychopathology 
or diagnosable psychiatric illness" (S. P. Singh, et aI., 1998, p. 74). Singh et aI. did find, 
however, that each of the 22 students experienced feelings of political alienation and 
powerlessness as a consequence of the policy. They point out that the students 
demonstrated a "high degree of hostility" and that "protest of some kind was the only 
option left to show their resentment" (S. P. Singh, et aI., 1998, p. 74). Thus, rather than 
being a product of psychological predisposition or suicidal tendencies, self-immolation, 
in these instances, were responses to a power shift in the deeply entrenched socio-
political hierarchy. 
The work of Singh et aI. demonstrates how some recent scholars have begun to 
utilize a more discriminatory definition, taking into account only those cases which may 
be politically linked. In doing so, they have sampled cases that are conceptually similar 
which lends more credibility to their findings. However, Singh et al. continues to 
approach self-immolation from the perspective of individual behavior. While this is not 
necessarily a methodological problem, it neglects the role of self-immolation in broader 
socio-political context. Specifically, Singh et al. fail to address the social or political 
implications of self-immolation. 
More recently, several scholars have attempted to bridge this gap by shifting away 
from the individual approach. Kim (2008) and Uehling (2000), for example, look at self-
immolation in terms of issue framing and mobilization. In a study of self-immolations in 
South Korea (the second case selected for this study), Kim contends that protesters 
13 
sought to "spawn and invigorate movement activism among half-hearted activists and 
apathetic bystanders and instigate further protest activities" (H. Kim, 2008, p. 549). They 
did so, according to the author, by drawing attention to and framing the issue as an 
injustice that demanded immediate action (H. Kim, 2008). Similarly, Uehling argues that 
the self-immolation of Musa Mamut effectively framed the issue of Crimean Tartar 
repatriation by reconstructing the community's conception of the nation (Uehling, 2000). 
Michael Biggs (2005) wanted to understand the social and political motivations behind 
self-immolation. In his study Biggs argues first that self-immolation can be "an appeal to 
others to change their behavior" (Biggs, 2005, p. 196). In this case, the appeal is directed 
at either a primary target, namely the power-holders, or a secondary target, specifically 
public opinion. It can also be a means of mobilization, aimed at "others who already 
share the collective cause," by galvanizing them to engage in protest" (Biggs, 2005, p. 
197). 
The recent works by social scientists, although relatively few in number, have 
made important contributions and advancements in the study of self-immolation. Most 
notably, they have moved beyond the common treatment of the immolator as an 
irrational, one-dimensional subject, who is insulated from the influence of exogenous 
variables. However, many questions have remained unaddressed. Specifically, is self-
immolation effective in the process of mobilization and the initiation of political change? 
As Biggs observes, "The efficacy of suffering is an unexplored dimension of protest, and 
deserves further research" (Biggs, 2005, p. 208). Kim and Uehling, on the other hand, 
have examined self-immolation as a tool of mobilization among those in a similar 
political community - those who share common goals and identities (H. Kim, 2008; 
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Uehling, 2000). But, they do not consider its efficacy in mobilizing the periphery or in 
initiating political change. 
At this point, it is important to note an additional methodological concern which 
hinders many of the studies previously cited here. As we have seen, these studies are 
narrowly focused on specific geographic, cultural, or political areas. For example, the 
studies by Geller, Ashton et aI., and Rothschild et aI. sample only from the US, the UK, 
and Germany (Ashton & Donnan, 1981; Geller, 1997; Rothschild, et aI., 2001), 
respectively. Similarly, the data collected by Singh et aI., Kim, and Uehling are taken 
exclusively from distinct socio-political populations, and each study includes only cases 
that are directly associated with one political issue (H. Kim, 2008; S. P. Singh, et aI., 
1998; Uehling, 2000). In other words, they fail to look for consistent patterns that may 
cross geographical, cultural, and socio-political boundaries, thereby inhibiting the 
generalizability ofthe authors' findings. Kim appropriately acknowledges this concern 
by stating that "it is hard to generalize the Korean cases to other incidents of suicide 
protest around the world" (H. Kim, 2008, p. 574). 
In sum, the weaknesses in the literature are: primarily due to broad and inconstant 
conceptual definitions, which in tum lead to inappropriate classification and comparison. 
In addition, previous authors have confined their analysis to single cases, significantly 
confining the generalizability of their conclusions. In the following sections of this 
chapter, I will rectify these conceptual and methodological shortcomings. 
Self-immolation: A Conceptual Definition 
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So what is self-immolation, and how does it compare to other forms of social and 
political suicide? As it turns out, self-immolation is a complex and nuanced concept, 
subject to a multitude of interpretations. We have seen thus far that that there is a 
propensity for scholars to oversimplify what constitutes self-immolation. These vague 
and broad interpretations render them insufficient for the purposes here, and highlight the 
need for conceptual clarification. Therefore, in this section I will systematically outline a 
conceptual typology of self-immolation, comparing and contrasting it to a variety of other 
social and political suicide types. As I proceed, it should progressively become apparent 
to the reader that the act of self-immolation, while certainly akin to some types of suicide, 
stands on its own as a unique socio-political phenomenon. 
At the broadest level suicide can be broken down into two types. The distinction 
primarily hinges on the motivations of the individua1.4 On the one hand, someone may 
commit suicide for strictly personal reasons (Farbe:row, 1975). For instance, a person 
who suffers from depression, poverty, or terminal illness might decide to take their own 
life to escape the pains they have come to associate with living. 5 Others derive their 
suicidal motivations from an intense attachment to an identifiable community. This 
4 It is important to note that determining the motivations behind a suicide may sometimes be a difficult task 
without the victim explicitly divulging them (i.e. in a note or message). One can certainly imagine 
instances of personal suicide that resemble collective suicide, and vice versa. However, a reasonable 
observer should be able to frequently and accurately extrapo~ate the motivations from the circumstances 
surrounding the incident. For example, it would be careless to assume that someone who took their life in 
the privacy of their home following an emotionally devastating personal experience had non-personal 
motives. Similarly, it would be equally careless to dismiss an obviously detailed and choreographed 
suicide that took place in the midst of a public demonstration as the result of depression or personal 
problems. 
5 It might be argued that personal and political motivations are not mutually exclusive. For instance, those 
who wish for the right to commit suicide for personal reasons may make the act a political statement. 
However, the primary intent in this case is suicide itself with secondary political consequences. The intent 
of self-immolator is strictly political. A simple way to detennine this is to ask whether the desire for 
suicide or the political issue existed fIrst. If the desire for suiicide is the political issue, the former logically 
precedes the latter. 
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social variant of suicide, which Durkheim refers to as altruistic suicide, is a manifestation 
of collective behavior (Durkheim, 1951). It is this latter type that will be the primary 
focus here. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Flowchart of Altruistic/Collective Suicide 
...... ..... 
. . 
: Sati • 
. 
••••••••••• • t! 
........ 
. 
. Seppuku : 
I •••••••••••••••••• : 
..... 1.. .. 
. . 
~ Cult ~ 

































: Heroism ~ 
• • •.••......... . .• 











Altruistic suicide can be broken down further into what I refer to as cultural, 
socio-psychological, or political types. Cultural suicide would include practices that are 
imbedded in and prescribed by tradition and historical beliefs and values. Two 
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illustrative examples of cultural suicide are sati and seppuku. Sati, practiced almost 
exclusively in the Asian subcontinent, involved a widow throwing herself upon the 
funeral pyre of her deceased husband. Seppuku was a ritualized method of 
disembowelment mostly practiced by the Japanese Samurai when they believed they had 
brought dishonor to themselves, their family, or their community. Both of these practices 
were long-standing traditions in the cultural history of each respective civilization. 
However, although there have continued to be isolated cases of sati and seppuku in recent 
history, both were ultimately abandoned, presumably in part as a result of the diffusion of 
Western cultural values during colonialism and the Meiji Restoration, respectively. 
The socio-psychological type refers almost exclusively to cult mass suicides, such 
as the incident that occurred at Jonestown. Unlike cultural suicide, which is based on 
social traditions that have been handed down over the course of generations, the 
motivations for socio-psychological suicide are powerful and emerge rather quickly, 
largely due to the groups' authoritarian hierarchical structure and strict isolation from 
mainstream society (Richardson, 1993). In fact, the common perception of these groups 
is that they are "unfamiliar and perhaps even disliked or feared" (Richardson, 1993, p. 
348). 
So, how is self-immolation different from cultural or socio-psychological suicide? 
First, while many of the instances of self-immolation that occurred prior to the twentieth 
century might fall into one of these two categorical types, the alarmingly high number of 
modem self-immolations beginning in the 1960s have been politically motivated (Biggs, 
2005). Furthermore, modem self-immolators seek to elicit a response from both the 
public and the political realm. Conversely, the other two types of suicides are either 
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integrated within the fabric of society (cultural) or completely removed from it (socio-
psychological). This logically results in social and political ignorance in the former type 
and ambivalence in the latter. 
Political motivation, however, does not define self-immolation, per se. In fact, 
there are a variety of types of politically motivated suicides that could not reasonably be 
labeled self-immolation. To continue with our typological discussion, let us separate 
politically motivated suicide into two categories. The first I refer to as institutional 
suicide. These are suicides in which the subject is operating on behalf of a legitimate 
political entity. In such cases, the suicide is often perceived as an act of patriotism or 
heroism. It is a sacrifice of one's life for the preservation and promotion of the national 
political interests, particularly security. Institutional suicide is most prevalent amongst 
members of the armed forces during times of war. An obvious example would be the 
soldier who, in the threat of imminent danger to their mission or fellow soldiers, accepts 
the brunt of a destructive force. Another example would be the Japanese kamikaze pilots 
during World War II who willfully flew their planes into military targets.6 
This leads us to the second type of politically motivated suicide, which I refer to 
as counter-institutional. Unlike institutional suicide, which is sanctioned by a legitimate 
political authority, counter-institutional suicide is committed by an individual or 
individuals who are acting in opposition to that authority. It is first important to note that 
there are almost no limitations on the relationship between the individual and the target 
political system. On the one hand, the political system may be of foreign or domestic 
6 Some might take issue with the tenn suicide being used to describe wartime "'heroism." Admittedly, I use 
this tenn broadly, simply suggesting that it is an act of an individual taking their own life. Again, however, 
the nuance of such a concept lies in the intent itself. Neither heroism nor self-immolation is suicide for 
personal reasons. They are both sacrifices for an external objective. 
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orientation to the individual. A foreign political power may be one that is not the 
recognized political authority over the state or territory - as was the case following the 
installation of the Iraqi Interim Government in 2004. While the US was not officially in 
power, it maintained a political/military presence. A foreign power may also be one that 
is the recognized authority. This is a much more common situation, exemplified by the 
relationship between China and the Tibetans. Although Tibet is internationally accepted 
as part of China, it is an autonomous region. A domestic political authority, on the other 
hand, is indisputably recognized by the public. 
To briefly restate, collective suicide can be motivated by cultural norms and 
traditions, socio-psychological conditions prompted by the circumstances prevalent in 
socially isolated groups, and political relationships that manifest as either actions of 
institutional devotion or counter-institutional protest. Furthermore, each of these 
situations results in a different public perception. In the case of cultural suicide, the 
incident is understandably met with public approval, thus reinforcing the tradition. 
Socio-psychological suicide often elicits public reactions of ambivalence or even 
revulsion. Institutional political suicide is generally met with public pride and honor. 
But, what specifically is counter··institutional suicide and what are its consequences? 
I identify two types of counter-institutional suicide: the passive and the active. 
While both have similar motivations, the approaches and/or consequences are different. 
Let us begin with the passive approach. Passive suicide is a form of protest intended to 
initiate political change by evoking an emotional response, typically sympathy, from the 
observer. The primary objective of the passive approach, howevt:r, is to initiate political 
change. Thus, death is not a goal; it is merely an accepted risk. The ideal type of the 
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passive approach would be a hunger strike. Like many political protesters, the hunger 
striker is impotent relative to the political authority, and thus, seeks to shift the balance of 
power through unconventional means. One way of doing this is by rallying sympathizers 
to their cause. However, the hunger striker does not actively seek death. The hunger 
strike is merely a bargaining tool. In other words, unlike the self-immolator whose 
"death is not conditional on the opponent's (in)action," if the hunger striker's demands 
are met, the strike will presumably end (Biggs, 2005, p. 174). 
Like their passive counterparts, those who commit active counter-institutional 
suicide seek political change by eliciting an emotional reaction from observers. 
However, the desired effect is dependent upon the protesters method of destruction. In 
the case of suicide attackers, the destruction is directed outward to maximize the physical 
damage inflicted on persons and property in proximity of the attack, and the 
psychological damage inflicted on the observers (Pape, 2005). Self-immolation, on the 
other hand, is directed inward, focusing the destruction on the protester.7 While physical 
damage can occur in cases of self-immolation (Biggs, 2005), it is typically relatively 
minimal compared to the suicide attack. But, the psychological effects can be every bit 
as destructive. Additionally, the perception by the target audiences of these two types of 
action is significantly different. While suicide attacks terrorize, and therefore, anger and 
alienate moderate elements of society, self-immolation produces feelings of horror, 
disgust, and empathy for the protester (Pape, 2005). 
7 A common understanding of self-immolation is that it specifically means suicide by fire. However, self-
immolation is merely a sacrifice of one's life, regardless of how the suicide was carried out. Therefore, 
although most of the instances of self-immolation are indeed self-incinerations, as we shall see, other 
methods of politically suicides are included in this study. 
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It is also important to distinguish between two types of self-immolation cases. On 
the one hand, there are those that seek to initiate political change. For these individuals 
the motive is to mobilize supporters and sympathizers, and further a political agenda. 
This type is exemplified by the immolation of Thich Quang Duc in Vietnam in 1963. His 
primary objective was to contribute to the existing political struggle (Biggs, 2005). He 
even coordinated his act with the help of other protesters (Biggs, 2005). On the other 
hand, there are those who merely seek to express a political griev,mce. While the 
primary motive of this type is not necessarily to mobilize collective action, it often serves 
as the impetus. This type is represented in the case of Bouazizi in Tunisia. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Bouazizi wanted to mobilize protesters. He was simply angry 
with the political conditions in Tunisia and the injustices he had experienced, and wanted 
to express his political frustrations (Gardner, 2011). However, as it turned out, 
Bouazizi's political expression caused massive public outrage which ultimately led to 
revolution. 
In short, I define self-immolation in this study as a politically motivated act, either 
to mobilize supporters or express a political grievance, which is independent of cultural 
and socio-psychological variables. It occurs in opposition to a legitimate political 
authority, rather than being sanctioned by it. Additionally, the self-immolator's primary 
goal is to achieve a political objective through death, regardless of method. Finally, 
unlike the suicide attacker, the self-immolator does not seek to physically injure others or 
damage property. They only wish to generate the maximum psychological impact. 
The Collective Action Framework 
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So, how can we begin to approach a phenomenon that is a manifestation of social 
and political interaction, an act that clearly has significant political implications but 
occurs outside the institutional political framework? Given the common existence of 
political grievances and the means by which the self-immolator seeks to rectifY them, it is 
necessary to consult the theoretical literature on collective action. Collective action 
theory is especially relevant to this study because it addresses, not only functions of 
individual actors and collective groups in the social processes of mobilization, but also 
the extra-institutional opportunities that expand and contract with changes in the political 
structure. 
As is the case with the psychopathological approach to self-immolation, 
irrationality seems to be the default theoretical starting point for explaining many 
behavioral phenomena. However, this answer frequently proves both superficial and 
insufficient, and is often discarded or discredited as the theory develops. For example, in 
the theory of collective action, the collective behavior and relative deprivation 
approaches marked the initial attempts to offer explanations. These approaches suggest 
that collective action is merely an emotional response to uncontrollable stimuli of the 
external world (Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1963). However, both approaches have largely 
been abandoned by current collective action scholars and have since been replaced by 
theories that adopt assumptions of individual rationality and structural-functional 
importance (Della Porta & Diani., 1999). 
Given our interest here in understanding the mobilizing efficacy of self-
immolation on the core and periphery, we must first tum our attention to individual 
rationality. It is convenient to think of communities, whether immediate (core) or 
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extended (periphery), as tangible and discrete entities with identifiable and continuous 
characteristics. Communities, however, are nothing more than the sum of their parts. 
Therefore, it is difficult to accurately predict behavior at the community level. But, if we 
can understand how individuals typically behave under certain circumstances, we can 
draw assumptions about collective behavior. 
In order to exert influence on the political system, collective groups must 
mobilize supporters who will actively advance their political agenda. Understandably, 
the more supporters there are fighting for the cause, the more likely the collective group 
will be in achieving its goals. But, as Olson points out, it is typically extremely difficult 
to mobilize supporters because there is a propensity for rational individuals to abstain 
from action in which the costs outweigh the benefits (Olson, 1965). For Oliver, Marwell, 
and Teixeira, this difficulty can be overcome with the development of a "critical mass," 
or a "small segment of the population that chooses to make big contributions to the 
collective action while the majority do little or nothing" (Oliver, (~t aI., 1985, p. 524). If 
an individual or a small group bears the brunt of the burden of sacrifice, they may 
increase the likelihood of drawing supporters. While Olson and Oliver et al. were 
primarily referring to the benefits of participation in interest groups, their theories are 
relevant here. When the benefit in question is the rectification of a political grievance, 
the stake in participation arguably increases in value, particularly for those who possess 
the grievance (the core). If we think of the immolator as a critical mass, then they can 
effectively reach the periphery by producing devastating and lasting psychological effects 
through powerful imagery and feelings of horror (Cavarero, 2007). Thus, as it relates to 
instances of self-immolation, the success of mobilization is dependent on the diffusion of 
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the grievance throughout the core, and the ability of the immolator to elicit sympathy and 
cause unsettling psychological consequences on the periphery. 
Mobilization is also affected by the structure of the political system and the 
opportunities that emerge as a consequence. The likelihood of mobilization, for 
proponents of the political opportunity school of thought, can be directly attributed to the 
existence of four conditions (Tarrow, 1998). First, the degree of access to the political 
processes can foster, stymie, or neutralize attempts at mobilization (Tarrow, 1998). 
Systems that offer a high degree of access provide an outlet for political action through 
legitimate institutional mechanisms. In closed political systems, on the other hand, there 
is little opportunity for collective groups to organize. It is in syste:ms with only moderate 
access to legitimate institutional processes that tend to be the most fertile environment for 
collective action to occur. Political opportunity is also created by systemic instability 
caused by shifting political alignments and divisions within the elites (Tarrow, 1998). 
Thus, instability diminishes a regime's ability to react to the mobilization of collective 
groups. Additionally, opportunity is created when a group has access to a powerful ally 
within the system (Tarrow, 1998). It might be argued that this is related, not only to 
procedural institutional access, but also the opening of the social system, including 
loosing restriction on political discourse and the development of social networks. 
Finally, political opportunity opens or closes depending on the perceived tolerance of the 
state for collective action (Tarrow, 1998). If a regime is likely to respond with repressive 
tactics, opportunities for mobilization decrease. The theory of political opportunity 
provides a framework for understanding self-immolation in relation to the political 
system. As we shall see in later (;hapters, both India and South Korea were moderately 
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open socio-political systems that had recently expanded political competition (India) and 
tolerance for social mobilization (South Korea). 
Finally, depending on the social structure, the existence of political opportunity, 
and the grievance itself, protesters select tactics that are perceived to have the most 
advantageous impact. Generally speaking, protest tactics have three primary functions 
and are selected on the basis of the desired goal or effect. According to Della Porta and 
Diani, protest tactics are used 1) to draw support to the cause, 2) to disrupt social, 
political and economic functions" and 3) to demonstrate the protester's willingness to 
sacrifice themselves for the cause (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). Additionally, protest 
tactics can be divided into two sub-categories: the violent and the non-violent. The 
frequency and magnitude of violence is likely to be exacerbated if the group and its 
grievances are not recognized by the opposition (Oberschall, 1970), and therefore is not 
conditional on the type of political system. In other words, violent protest may occur in 
democratic and non-democratic systems alike. Non-violence, according to McAdam and 
Tarrow, can also be an effective strategic method of protest, but its effects tend to vary 
depending on system type (McAdam & Tarrow, 2(00). In democratic systems, non-
violence constrains the response capabilities of the state (McAdam & Tarrow, 2(00). 
Theoretically, this is because democratic regimes are accountable to the public. In non-
democratic systems, on the other hand, non-violence can effectively mobilize a base of 
sympathizers (McAdam & Tarrow, 2(00). Self-immolation is a unique protest tactic 
because, in varying degrees, it fulfills all three functions outlined by Della Porta and 
Diani. Furthermore, it resides in a theoretical gray area between violent and non-violent, 
depending on the interpretation of the observer. I propose that self-immolation, in terms 
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of outcome, might actually fit both the violent and the non-violent models of protest 
tactics, simultaneously. 
Data and Methods 
Since one of the goals of this research is to reach beyond the limitations of single 
case studies which, as we have seen, are prevalent in the existing literature, I conduct a 
systematic comparative study between the anti-reservation movement in India and the 
pro democracy movement in South Korea. These two cases represent moderately open 
socio-political systems that both experienced a high number of self-immolations during 
their respective protests. However, each movement's ability to mobilize and initiate 
political change differed significantly. 
The data for this work will consist of descriptive accounts of the selected self-
immolations and the corresponding social and political events that transpired immediately 
after. I draw data from two types of sources. In the case of South Korea's prodemocracy 
movement, I am able to rely exclusively on academic accounts, including data compiled 
by the Stanford Korea Democracy Project. However, the academic community has given 
far less attention to the events surrounding India's anti-reservation movement. Therefore, 
it is necessary to supplement the academic work with accounts published in newspaper 
articles retrieved from the LexisNexis database. In retrieving these articles, I cross-
referenced the keywords "India" along with 1) "self-immolation," "immolation," or 
"immolate," or 2) any combination of the keywords "suicide" andl "protest." 
It is also important to note that, because the study of self-immolation is still in its 
infancy, data are scattered and incomplete. To date, there is no centrally accessible, 
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organized, or comprehensive location from which to retrieve information on instances of 
self-immolations. The data that do exist have been compiled by scholars in pieces for the 
purposes of their respective studies. Biggs is the only scholar to aggressively pursue the 
compilation of a database, which is unavailable to independent researchers. However, 
even Biggs acknowledges that the 533 cases he identifies falls grossly short of the actual 
number (Biggs, 2005). In fact, he estimates that the number of self-immolations 
occurring between 1963 and 2002 likely ranges from as few as 800 to as many as 3000 
(Biggs, 2005). In addition, some data have yet to be uncovered by scholars. This 
discrepancy can be explained by a number of reasons. First, some cases have been 
reported but only appear in publications not frequently accessed by the international 
audience, including most scholars (Biggs, 2005). Second, a vast number of cases are not 
reported at all, or are suppressed by government officials or power-holders (Biggs, 2005). 
Finally, some accounts exist only in periodicals or newspaper articles that are only 
available in the primary language of the country in which the event occurred. It should 
be evident that this is a considerable hindrance when compiling data on self-immolations. 
While it is important to acknowledge such limitations, they are unavoidable at this time. 
Additionally, defining and measuring the concepts used in this study are 
admittedly challenging tasks. Efficacy, for the purposes here, refers to the ability of self-
immolation to initiate changes in the social and political systems. But, the types of 
changes are dependent upon which target group we are discussing. In terms of core 
mobilization, I am looking for evidence of increased protest activity and organizational 
capacity. The former is evidenct:~d by a rise in the number of protesters or frequency of 
protest events. The latter exists when there is an emergence of a <:entralleadership, a 
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consolidation of smaller organizations or groups, or an overall and consistent change in 
protest tactics. An ancillary factor that would suggest greater organizational capacity is 
the movement's long-term sustainability because it is reasonable to assume that 
movements that are able to survive over a longer period are more organized. Periphery 
mobilization refers to a shift in the cognitive framework of a large segment of society. 
Evidence of periphery mobilization can manifest not only in direct participation in the 
movement's activities, but also in indirect activity, such as the emergence of propaganda 
or changes in political support. I define political change as any shift in institutional 
political behavior in favor of the immolator's cause, such as compromise, conciliatory 
action, or policy reform. It also refers to alterations of the political structure, such as 
regime change. Finally, I define openness in two ways. The first is political openness, 
determined by access to institutional political processes (i.e. voting rights, the existence 
of interest groups, or the existenc:e of two or more competitive political parties) and the 
tolerance of a regime for extra-institutional political appeals. In other words, is the 
regime likely to forcibly repress extra-institutional political action? The second is social 
openness, or the ability of individuals and groups to organize and engage in politically 
related discussion without political interference. While these definitions and 
measurements might at first appear to be somewhat abstract and complex, they should 
become much clearer in the following chapters when they are applied to the anti-




Michael Biggs (2005) argues that instances of self-immolation are positively 
correlated with the existence of democracy, highlighting the propensity for totalitarian 
regimes to suppress information. Adopting a rational choice approach, he states that 
"Because self-immolation is less likely to have an impact [due to information 
suppression], individuals in totalitarian states are less likely to commit such an act" 
(Biggs, 2005, pp. 187-188). Two countries offered in support of this claim are India and 
South Korea, ranking first and third, respectively, in Biggs's tally of self-immolations. 
But, can we really place countries such as India and South Korea in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s alongside countries with fully open socio-political systems, such as the 
United States, as Biggs does? Biggs's conclusions regarding a self-
immolation/democracy correlation is corrupted primarily by two methodological errors. 
First, he applies a dichotomous definition of procedural democracy, failing to account for 
varying factors like electoral competition. This leads him to lump together a number of 
vastly different types of political systems under the heading of democracy, without 
considering the implications of the extent of democratization on, not only the propensity 
for someone to self-immolate, but also how society and the politieal system will react. 
Second, he fails to acknowledge the importance of liberalization in the social structure. 
However, it is not enough to consider the conditions of the social and political structures 
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independent of one another because the two are interactive. Thus, in determining 
openness, or what I refer to as level of participation, I account for the overall socio-
political climate. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first part, I will demonstrate that 
although India and South Korea were different in a number of ways, at the time of their 
respective movements, the two countries were in stages of moderately open socio-
political participatory systems. Specifically, while India was becoming more electorally 
competitive, South Korea was developing significant organizational and communicative 
capabilities at the social level. In the second section, I will focus on introducing the cases 
of the anti-reservation and prodemocracy movements. This will include a description of 
each case in order to provide the social and political contexts in which these the self-
immolations occurred. In doing so, I will discuss the recent history of each country 
leading up to the events of each movement, and offer a description of the political 
environment, including such factors as institutional access, level of electoral competition, 
and strength of the regime. I will also cover the social environment, which will include 
factors such as social cohesion and the existence of a civil society. As it turns out, when 
we take into account both social and political dynamics, the cases more closely support 
the theory that collective action is most likely to occur in moderately open systems 
(Tarrow, 1998), whether the openings exist in the social or political spheres, or both. 
At the time of the anti-reservation and prodemocracy movements, India and South 
Korea were experiencing substantial socio-political structural changes that were 
dramatically affecting the participatory opportunities available to the people. Put simply, 
both countries were transitioning toward more open participatory systems. India, while 
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nominally a multi-party constitutional democracy since 1950, was in reality almost 
exclusively a single-party aristocracy until the late] 980s. This was largely a 
consequence of divisions of political interest along caste and class lines, and inequity of 
power due to the imbalanced distribution of socio-economic resources. In other words, 
the India National Congress Party (Congress), which maintained almost uninterrupted 
control8 throughout these four decades, consisted of and represented the privileged elites 
oflndian society. Thus, not only were the interests ofthese elites consistently the 
primary concern of the Indian government during this period, the wealth and resources of 
its elite constituency perpetuated the Congress's hold on power. Furthermore, from 1975 
to 1977, India experienced authoritarian rule, a crackdown on opposition groups, and the 
suspension of civil liberties during the Emergency period under Indira Gandhi. It was not 
until the late 1980s that India began to show signs of electoral competition and the 
emergence of a strong civil society. 
Similarly, South Korea experienced almost uninterrupted authoritarian rule 
beginning with its independence from the Japanese until the democratic elections of 
1987. During this time, a string of autocratic leaders carne to power and maintained 
control through fraud, coercion, and sometimes military clout. Elections, when held, 
typically consisted of only one c(mdidate: the incumbent. And, when a change of power 
did occur, it was usually the result of either the incapacitation of the current leader, or a 
military backed coup d'etat. However, beginning in the early 1980s, South Korea, while 
still institutionally non-participatory, began to relax its restriction of social activity. This 
8 An opposition coalition briefly ousted the Congress in 1977, but remained in power for only two years 
before the Congress reclaimed control. As we shall see later, this short change in party rule was the result 
of a perfect storm of social and political variables rather than the existence of true political competition. 
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opened the door to the formation of vast networks of social organizations (many of which 
were politically oriented) and increased discussion of previously taboo topics such as 
constitutional reform (S. Kim, 2012). 
As we can clearly see, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, both India and 
South Korea were undergoing substantial structural changes that greatly increased the 
public's participatory capacity. However, there still existed significant limitations on 
participation, both socially and politically. Although the opposition parties in India were 
emerging as political contenders, even as a coalition they still did not have the clout or 
the resources of the Congress. In South Korea, participation was I~ompletely limited to 
the social sphere; politically the country was still completely non-democratic. 
Furthermore, as we shall see later, both regimes were capable of launching a violent 
response to extra-institutional collective action. Thus, I maintain that, when taking into 
account the overall socio-political environment, both India and South Korea were 
moderately open. Let us now take a look at the anti-reservation and prodemocracy 
movements, and the social, political, and historical contexts in which they occurred. 
The Anti-reservation Movement of India 
India has a long history of social stratification and discrimination resulting from 
the hierarchical social order of the caste system. The legacy of this system has not only 
institutionalized inequality and constrained social mobility, it has also established a 
culture of animosity, frustration, and social division anchored in cultural identities that 
have been passed down over countless generations (McCormick, 2004). Throughout the 
last century, however, India has clearly made a considerable effort to minimize the 
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consequences of this antiquated social hierarchy, most notably through reservation 
initiatives that expanded opportunities for social and economic advancement to those of 
castes and classes identified as historically disadvantaged (Sharma, 2005). 
Initially, reservation was limited to Muslim minorities and Untouchables, granting 
each group its own electorate (Sharma, 2005). However, following independence, the 
reservation policy was expanded to include social and economic opportunity as well. In 
1950, the newly enacted Constitution established that 22.5 percent of all academic 
admissions and public sector jobs, the most coveted jobs in India, would be set aside for 
members of the "Scheduled Classes and Scheduled Tribes" (SC/ST) (Sharma, 2005). 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Constitution, the Indian government assumed 
responsibility for identifying and protecting disadvantaged groups (Sharma, 2005). 
According to Article 46 of the Constitution: 
The State shall promote with special care the educational ,md economic 
interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from 
social injustice and all f01IDS of exploitation (cgsird.gov.in). 
So, what constitutes a disadvantaged group, and what measures should the 
government take? In order to address these questions the Constitution allows for 
the appointment of a special commission to define (or redefine) disadvantaged 
groups and offer recommendations as to the course of action. Article 340 states: 
The President may by order appoint a Commission consisting of such 
persons as he thinks fit to investigate the conditions of socially and 
-----------e--,a.-u-ca-ct..-lO-nally backward classes within the territory ofIndia andthe 
difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations as to 
the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such 
difficulties and to improve their condition and as to the gnmts that should 
be made for the purpose by the Union or any State and the conditions 
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subject to which such grants should be made, and the order appointing 
such Commission shall define the procedure to be followed by the 
Commission (cgsird.gov.in). 
While the initial reservations provided in the Constitution were certainly 
controversial, the policy was widely recognized as an evil necessary to achieving stability 
and ensuring that India's democratic experiment would be a success. But, as Sharma 
points out, reservation did little to eradicate caste identity, or heal the social cleavages 
and contention between groups (Sharma, 2005). As a matter of fact, if anything, the 
policy served only to highlight caste and class distinctions and institutionalize contention 
both socially and politically (Sharma, 2005). 
The social and political consequences of caste-based divisions are interrelated, 
and can best be demonstrated by looking at the way in which the social translates into the 
political. We can clearly see the legacy of social fragmentation in the structural and 
functional political dynamics that emerged in post-colonial India. Just as caste ensured 
social inequality, it also institutionalized political inequality; caste defined political 
affiliations, not just party affiliation but any type of cooperative organization; it dictated 
the issues and platforms for which political groups stood; and it shaped the way in which 
power was distributed. In short, the social legacy of the caste system was the foundation 
for India's entire political system between Independence and the anti-reservation protests 
of 1990. 
With this in mind, the manifestation of social inequality as power inequality and 
contention in the political system can be clearly demonstrated in the political history 
between 1950 and the early 1990s. As we shall also see, this socio-political dynamic 
ultimately served as the basis for India's turmoil in 1990. From 1950 to 1977, the 
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Congress continually trounced its opposition. In fact, until 1967 it had "never won less 
than 73 percent of the seats in Parliament" (Heitzman & Worden, 1995). The Congress 
experienced a very brief decline in 1977 when it lost power to the Janata coalition. As 
Heitzman and Worden note, this was partly due to poor economic conditions and changes 
in demographics, as well as a split within the Congress (Heitzman & Worden, 1995). 
However, by 1980, it was back to business as usual when the Congress reconsolidated 
and defeated Janata. By 1989, however, there was once again trouble on the horizon for 
the Congress. Mired in scandal, the Congress lost much of its support base to either 
abstention or defection, ensuring victory for the reorganized Janata. It must be stated, 
though, that the results of the election were more a condemnation of the Congress than 
genuine support for Janata. The 1989 election was effectively a referendum on the 
Congress more than approval of the opposition (Heitzman & Worden, 1995). But, as fate 
would have it, this referendum was all that was needed to set in motion the tumultuous 
and devastating chain of events of 1990. 
So, what led to the anti-reservation protests and the myriad self-immolations that 
ensued? Two years after the defeat of Congress in 1977, the Janata regime exercised its 
constitutional right and appointed the MandaI Commission to revisit the issue of class 
identification and reservation. In its report, MandaI vastly expanded the definition of the 
SC/STs to include 52 percent of India's population, and recommended that an additional 
27 percent of government jobs be reserved, bringing the total to 49.5 percent (Sharma, 
2005). But, by the time of the report's publication in 1981, the Congress had already 
been returned to power and, in consistency with the interests of its constituency, quickly 
shelved MandaI's findings. The crisis had been averted for the time being but not for 
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good. After the Janata emerged victorious in the 1989 elections, its leaders, headed by 
Prime Minister V. P. Singh, had no illusions that its hold on power was anything other 
than tenuous. Thus, Singh decided to make a bold political move in an effort to 
consolidate his base. On August 7, 1990, Singh announced that he would fully enforce 
the expansive recommendations of the MandaI Commission (Heitzman & Worden, 
1995). 
Although the implementation of the MandaI recommendations was almost certain 
to spark public outrage due to the controversial nature of the issue, India had experienced 
and dealt with reservation policies before. It is doubtful that leaders in the government, 
including Singh, expected the extent of chaos and instability that ultimately occurred. 
Almost immediately after the announcement, student protesters poured into the streets. 
Within a matter of days, protests had spread across the country, having the greatest 
impact in Utter Pradesh, New Delhi, Bihar, and Hyderabad (Lahiri, 2008). Additionally, 
the intensity of many of the protests was extremely high, frequently resulting in violence 
and conflict with authorities. Protesters rioted, blockaded entire sections of cities, and set 
fire to buildings and vehicles. Police often responded with tear gas, beatings, arrests, and 
in some cases gun fire. However, the intensity of individual protests and the use of 
specific types of tactics varied greatly. While many protesters rampaged violently, others 
demonstrated peacefully, using tactics such as sit-ins (Lahiri, 2008). During the first six 
weeks of collective action, many protesters, mostly students, were killed or injured, 
schools and businesses were closed, and neither side was giving an inch of ground 
(Lahiri, 2008). 
37 
On September 19t \ Rajiv Goswami, a student from the New Delhi University of 
Deshbandhu, emerged in the center of a protest, doused himself in kerosene, and lit 
himself on fire. Goswami was rushed to the hospital with burns covering 55 percent of 
his body (Lahiri, 2008). Although he survived the attempted self-immolation, his actions 
became a model for many future protesters in the anti-reservation movement (Lahiri, 
2008). Within days of Goswami's self-immolation, the gruesome act was being 
mimicked everywhere. The first death from self-immolation came on September 24 
when Surinder Singh Chauhan sustained bums covering 98 percent of his body (Bose, 
1990). Over the next six weeks, India was hit with a wave of self· immolations, some by 
fire, some by poisoning, and others by hanging. By the time the umest was over, 
approximately 130 people had self-immolated, with more than 60 resulting in death 
(Lahiri, 2008). 
Although remaining vigilant and uncompromising during the first month and a 
half of protests, V.P. Singh extended an invitation to protesters "to open talks with his 
Government" just eight days after the self-immolations began (Hazarika, 1990). After 
months of increasing incidents of self-immolation and sustained protest, Singh lost a 
confidence vote and was forced to resign on November 7, 1990 (Heitzman & Worden, 
1995). Several months later, the Janata coalition collapsed and the reservation policy was 
once again sidelined, which marked the abrupt evaporation of the anti-reservation 
movement. As it turns out, the MandaI recommendations were ultimately implemented 
two years later with little public response (Heitzman & Worden, 1995), perhaps a sign 
that both the Congress and Janata had politicized the issue. In short, the anti-reservation 
movement was a manifestation of caste conflict and social inequality. It can be 
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characterized as widespread and highly intense, yet inconsistent in terms of strategy and 
tactics. I will discuss the characteristics, structure, and functions of the movement more 
in the next chapter, which will in part deal with the mobilization efficacy of self-
immolation. 
The Prodemocracy Movement of South Korea 
Following Korean independence from the Japanese and the subsequent 
North/South split, the initial democracy established in the South was on shaky ground. 
Although Syngman Rhee had been legitimately and decisively elected president, it soon 
became clear he would not relinquish power quietly. Facing widt;:spread disapproval, 
Rhee embarked on a series of constitutional engineering campaigns, political strong-
arming tactics, and electoral fraud, in order to maintain his position as president (Savada 
& Shaw, 1990). It is surprising, however, that despite Rhee's ability to manipulate and 
control the political and electoral processes, he was unable to constrain popular action. 
The streets of South Korea were regularly packed with crowds of dissidents (S. Kim, 
2012). On April 19, 1960, the pt:ople, most of whom were students, had reached their 
threshold of tolerance for Rhee's authoritarian tactics and political shenanigans, and once 
again mobilized. The consequences of this popular uprising were twofold. First, the 
protesters forced Rhee to resign a week after the action began. Second, the protest, 
"known and celebrated as the April 19 Student Revolution," initiated a culture of popular 
contention against the government, a culture that remains vibrant to this day (Savada & 
Shaw, 1990). 
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The democratic regime that succeeded Rhee, however, was short-lived. The 
country suffered from weak leadership that was unable to effectively facilitate 
cooperation among the elites. Consequently, the economy stagnated, and the protesters, 
"to whom the Democratic Party owed its power, filled the streets almost daily, making 
numerous wide-ranging demands for political and economic refonns" that the Party was 
unable to deliver (Savada & Shaw, 1990). The leadership also faced another significant 
problem. It did not have the power or the clout to control the military, a dilemma that 
ultimately sealed its demise (Savada & Shaw, 1990). A year after the Democratic Party 
took control, the military staged a coup d' tat, installing General Park Chung Hee as 
president, and initiating a return to autocratic rule. Popular mobilization during the Park 
era, while still existent, underwent a significant decline in frequency. This is largely due 
to the fact that the economy was booming, resulting in the emergence of a substantial 
middle class, whose members were satisfied with their economic conditions, and 
therefore, accepted the political circumstances (Savada & Shaw, 1990). In addition, 
many of the activists who had previously constituted the bloodlines of political protest 
were imprisoned. 
Following the assassination of Park in 1979, South Korea experienced a period 
reminiscent of the post-Rhee era. In other words, there was a brief rule by a democratic 
regime committed to open electoral competition, the drafting of a new constitution, and 
the reinstitution of civil liberties. This was followed almost immediately by another 
military coup and authoritarian regime under Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan in 
1980. However, the Chun era ditTered from the Park era in several ways. First, the 
political activists who had been imprisoned under Park were released and began 
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establishing new social networks of activism. Second, it appears that the South Korean 
people's reintroduction to democratic governance, although brief, was enough to rekindle 
desires for meaningful democratic reform. Finally, with social networks expanding 
throughout society and the renewed desire for political reform, the contentment of 
economic progress among the middle class had begun to wane and the public's 
propensity for contentious extra-institutional collective action reemerged (Savada & 
Shaw, 1990). 
These factors first manifested during the Kwangju protests that occurred from 
May 18th to May 2ih of 1980. The Kwangju Uprising, often referTed to as a massacre, 
became infamous for the government's brutal handling of the situation (Savada & Shaw, 
1990). As the days went on, the demonstrators, who included both students and local 
residents, were repeatedly assaulted by military and police forces. This ultimately led to 
mass riots and the swelling of the: protesters' ranks. By the end of the event, more than 
fifty thousand people were participating, nearly two thousand had been arrested, and two 
hundred had been killed (Savada & Shaw, 1990). Although the government ruthlessly 
crushed the K wangju demonstrations, the repression did not stymie the pro democracy 
movement; it intensified it (Savada & Shaw, 1990). 
Throughout the early and mid-1980s, Chun further consolidated his power. He 
engaged in an effort to purge his opposition as well as anyone who had been active in the 
political system prior to his ascension to the presidency. Despite his efforts to eliminate 
political competition, Chun paid little attention to the growing social opposition to his 
authority. In fact, he actually took steps that facilitated it. During Chun's administration, 
the social networks of activism expanded and thrived, and a political culture of popular 
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contention, sometimes referred to as minjung, was taking hold (Lee, 2007). I will discuss 
minjung in more detail in the next chapter. 
Throughout the early and mid-1980s, protest was a regular occurrence, and it 
appeared as though the prodemoc:racy movement just needed a spark to set the inevitable 
in motion. As Kim observes: 
South Korea was being swept in a swirl of popular 
contention ... Demonstrations were everywhere, and in major cities hardly 
a day passed without passing by violent clashes between protesters and the 
police, or the smell of teargas. It was a time of renewed opportunity, and 
it was at this point that the number self-immolators started to swell (S. 
Kim, 2012, p. 11). 
The first spark came in 1985 when Hong Ki-Il self-immolated at the site of the 
Kwangju crackdown. This incident was followed by three more self-immolations the 
following year. Finally, in 1987, the pro democracy movement, after steadily picking up 
momentum over the previous two years, exploded (S. Kim, 2012) .. 
By 1987, opposition to the Chun regime had spread throughout the population, 
with more and more people joining the radical vision of political reform touted by 
students and the leaders of an increasingly powerful civil society. On April 13, 1987, 
Chun attempted to reestablish control over the social system, announcing that he would 
no longer tolerate discussion about constitutional reform. Howevl~r, this attempt to reign 
in dissent among an increasingly angry public proved futile. The movement was already 
barreling forward, too powerful to stop. To add insult to injury, information was revealed 
that Chun's government had tortured and killed a student activist, sending protesters into 
frenzy (S. Kim, 2012). Less than three months later, government leaders recognized that 
the public would no longer accept Chun in power, and on June 29, selected Roh Tae Woo 
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to replace him; surprisingly, Chun agreed to step aside. Upon assuming power, Roh 
declared his intention to adopt a "new democratic constitution that embodied all the 
opposition's demands" (Savada & Shaw, 1990). However, the movement had not come 
so far and put so much at stake to end the fight with an empty promise. After all, despite 
the rhetoric, Roh was still just another unelected president. Determined to ensure real 
democratic reform, the protesters relentlessly challenged the establishment, all the while 
leaving behind more and more deaths from self-immolation. In December of 1987, South 
Korea held elections that formally brought Roh to power. 
While this may have looked like victory to many, for the activists ofthe 
prodemocracy movement this was just the first step. Over the next several years, activists 
continued to push for additional reforms and concessions. By 1991, there was a second 
major push, accompanied by another massive wav(~ of self-immolations. However, by 
this time, South Korea had created enough political space through which to vent 
discontent via institutional mechanisms. As Kim observes, "by 1991, the political 
opportunities that were available during the 1985-1987 pro-democracy struggle were all 
but gone ... This partly explains the high peak of 1991 self-immolation coming to an 
abrupt decline, to no self-immolation in 1992" (S. Kim, 2012, p. 15). 
To this point, I have shown that both India and South Korea were in the midst of 
reshaping their social and political structures, which resulted in increasing participatory 
capacity. Additionally, I have outlined the details of each movement, highlighting the 
context in which they occurred. Now it is time to proceed to a discussion of the social 
and political effects of self-immolation. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how the 
structural and functional differences ofthese two movements gave way to considerably 
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divergent outcomes in terms of mobilization of core and peripheral groups, and the 
political changes that ensued. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 
As collective action theory suggests, movement activists choose protest tactics 
that are likely to have the greatest impact on the success of the collective group. In most 
cases, success is directly related to the group's ability to attract new members to the 
cause, to draw supplementary support from the public by eliciting emotional responses 
(i.e. sympathy, anger, or disgust), and to influence the behavior of a political actor or 
actors. In this chapter, I will assess the extent to which the acts of self-immolation during 
the anti-reservation and pro democracy movements affected changes in the actions of 
three target groups: the core base of support, the pt~riphery or general public, and the 
political actors. In order to accurately gauge change, it is important to have a holistic 
understanding of each movement, including characteristics such as intensity and 
sustainability, each movement's lifecycle and duration, structure and organization, and 
political outcome. I will begin with an overview of the lifecycle of each movement in 
order to demonstrate how they are polar opposites in terms of sustainability, patterns of 
intensity, and structure and organization. This portion will include how each movement 
began, progressed, and ultimately collapsed. In other words, while the anti-reservation 
movement was linearly structured, disorganized, brief, and exhibited consistent, high 
levels of intensity, the prodemocracy movement had a clear leadership hierarchy, was 
remarkably organized, lasted more than a decade, ~md progressively gained in intensity, 
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before experiencing a slow decline. Next, I will discuss the impacts of self-immolation 
on the mobilization of the core, the mobilization of the periphery, and the political 
outcomes of each movement. I argue that, while there was little to no impact on core 
mobilization, and only marginal impact on periphery mobilization and political change in 
India, there were significant effects on all three groups in South Korea. 
Before I begin, however, it is important to restate how efficacy is defined for each 
group. Core mobilization, for the purposes here, refers not only to an escalation in 
participation, but also an increase in the group's capacity for organization. Organization 
would include group or faction consolidation, the emergence of a central leadership or 
development of a hierarchical order, increased cooperation between groups, or a 
strengthening of group cohesion. There are several indicators that a movement has 
mobilized its core. The first and most direct way is to identify whether or not there is a 
change in number of core participants or events organized by core supporters. While 
accurate, this approach requires access to highly d(:tailed accounts of protest events, a 
luxury that rarely exists in the study of collective action. A second indicator is the length 
of the movement's existence. A movement that is well organized and structured will tend 
to have greater life expectancy. Another indicator is an increase in the number of formal 
organizations, or the consolidation of already existing organizations. Finally, we can 
infer changes to the organizational structure of the movement by observing the way it 
operates collectively. Specifically, a notable shift in the repertoires of protest across the 
movement as a whole would suggest an increase in organization and communication. 
Mobilization of the periphery occurs when there is a shift in the overall cognitive 
framework of those who either do not stand to benefit, or to whom the benefits are 
46 
perceived as largely unimportant. The difficulty, of course, lies in determining when a 
shift in cognitive framework occurs. Short of conducting survey research (which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis) or locating survey data that would indicate such a shift 
(which does not exist), I must rely on conclusions drawn from the events of each 
movement. Specifically, I am looking for evidence of direct participation by non-
activists, such as joining demonstrations, riots, or conflicts with authorities, or indirect 
participation, such as political expression, propaganda, or electoral influence. 
Political efficacy refers to any change in either behavior of political actors, or a 
shift in the political structure. When considering political efficacy, it must be noted that 
self-immolation can have both direct and indirect consequences on political behavior. 
While it is possible for the act itself to influence political change by evoking an 
emotional response in a public official, it is more likely that the change will indirectly 
stem from pressure caused by core and peripheral mobilization. Direct and indirect 
effects can sometimes be difficult to distinguish. However, in looking at the 
circumstances under which political change occurs, we can reasonably draw conclusions 
about the origin of the influence. 
The Movement Cycles 
The lifecycle of the anti-reservation movement can best be described as 
explosive; it was spontaneous, brief, and highly volatile. First, the movement did not 
come into existence through the development of networks of communication, the 
cultivation of a collective identity, or extensive efforts to mobilize supporters. It was 
instantaneously triggered by a single political event. Although there were most likely 
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those who opposed such a policy, possibly even groups that held an anti-reservation 
stance, there is no evidence to suggest any concerted effort by these individuals or groups 
to engage in or organize mass collective action prior to Singh's announcement. The 
collective response following the announcement, however, was immediate and pervasive. 
Within the first two weeks, protests were occurring in cities and provinces across the 
country; "the most affected areas were in UP [Uttar Pradesh], Bihar, New Delhi, and 
Hyderabad" (Lahiri, 2008, p. 185). The spontaneity of the movement is evident not only 
in its rise, but also in its abrupt decline. Unlike most movements that experience stages 
of decline, the anti-reservation effort transitioned from fully active to non-existent within 
a matter of a couple of weeks. Second, this movement was extremely short-lived. 
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment of beginning and end, the anti-
reservation movement lasted for at most four months. Finally, the movement was highly 
contentious, often times violent, with this level of intensity persisting throughout the 
movement's entire lifecycle. Instances of riots, destruction of property, injury, and death 
(not including suicide) are consistent throughout the existence of the movement. In fact, 
the only change in protest tactics occurred approximately six weeks into the movement 
with the first instance of self-immolation, initiating a wave that lasted until the movement 
collapsed. 
South Korea's prodemocracy movement differed from the anti-reservation 
movement in several ways. First, unlike the spontaneity of the anti-reservation 
movement, the issue of democratic reform had been simmering for years, perhaps even 
decades. The beginning of collective action advocating democratic reform in South 
Korea can be traced at least to the K wangju Uprising in 1980, and possibly as early as the 
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April 19 Student Revolution of 1960. It was during the 1980s, however, that a true 
prodemocracy movement began to take root. Over the course of the next ten years, the 
movement became increasingly organized, forming a web of social networks and 
consolidating countless groups and organizations tmder one leadership structure (Shin, 
Chang, Lee, & Kim, 2007). Furthermore, the intensity of the prodemocracy movement 
was progressive rather than constant. Although there were certainly contentious events 
early in the movement's history, they were low in frequency. As the movement 
progressed into the midl980s, the frequency of protest events began to exponentially 
increase (Shin, et aI., 2007). Similar to the anti-reservation movement, the self-
immolations associated with South Korean pro democracy movement did not initiate 
collective action. However, in the case of South Korea, self-immolation, beginning in 
1985, did immediately precede a dramatic rise in the frequency and intensity of collective 
action. It is also interesting to note that the instances of South Korean self-immolations 
peaked in the years 1987 and 1991 (Shin, et aI., 2007). As we know, it was in December 
of 1987 that South Korea took its first major step toward institutional democracy, electing 
Roh as president. But, by 1991 the prodemocracy movement was in serious decline, 
having lost virtually all but its most extreme activists. It appears that the peak in 1991 
was a last attempt to regain the movement's momentum, unsuccessfully as it turns out. 
To recap, these two movements exhibited very different characteristics and 
lifecycle patterns. The anti-reservation movement was spontaneous and brief with a high 
level of consistent intensity, and rapid decline. The prodemocracy movement, on the 
other hand, simmered at a low level of intensity for years before progressively increasing 
and peaking in the late 1980s. After summiting the apex of intensity, the movement 
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began to experience a steady decline, at which point there was a final mobilization effort 
that manifested in another spike of self-immolations. 
Mobilization of the Core 
The lifeline of a movement is its core base of support. These are individuals who 
identify deeply with the movement's goals and values. They sacrifice their time, 
resources, and in some instances, even their safety and liberty to further the collective 
agenda. In short, members of the core are the workforce ofthe movement. Thus, the 
ability of a movement to mobilize and engage its core base of support is essential to its 
success and long-term viability. But, as some have pointed out, despite the perceived 
importance of the movement's objectives, it is often extremely difficult to mobilize the 
core into action (Olson, 1965). But, in some instances, a powerful act of sacrifice can 
overcome this difficulty, turning the apathetic into dedicated activists (Marwell & Oliver, 
1993). Was this the case in our two studies? Let us first turn to India. 
There is nothing in the accounts of the anti-Teservation movement that would 
suggest that there were any notable changes in the number of student protesters or 
frequency of events following the first self-immolation on September 19th• But, there is 
one factor that might likely explain this. The issue in question was one of extreme 
contention, one perceived as not merely an attack on the students' prospects for future 
success, but also an attack on their cultural identity and natural rights. It is reasonable to 
assume that an issue of this magnitude would almost certainly draw most of its supporters 
and produce protest activity ofthe highest intensity early. This point is supported by the 
explosive beginning of the protests. In other words, any student who was going to be 
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involved would have done so well before Goswami's self-immolation, and thus there 
would be no more core individuals to join the collective action. In addition, it is hard to 
imagine a situation in which there would be opportunity for an increase in frequency, 
given the movement's extremely active beginning. Although the number of protesters 
and frequency of events offer little to suggest whether or not self-immolations helped 
mobilize the core, other structural-functional factors will offer some insights. 
First, if the core mobilized, it would be evident in an increase in the movement's 
overall structural organization. The anti-reservation movement consisted almost 
exclusively of a large number of student organizations (Lahiri, 2008). Most of these 
organizations had no association with other groups, and the ones that did had only loose 
affiliations (Lahiri, 2008). Furthermore, most of these organizations acted independently, 
making little or no effort at forming a coalition or consolidating the movement under one 
organized hierarchy of leadership (Lahiri, 2008). As Simanti Lahiri puts it, "no single 
student group took a dominant position within the movement. .. The creation of a single 
organization or even a strong coalition of groups was hindered by caste, class, and 
political divisions, many of which were replicated within the number and variety of 
student organizations working against MandaI" (Lahiri, 2008, pp. 186-187). 
Another factor to consider is this movement's lack of sustainability. This is 
directly tied to its organization because a movement that is organized is logically more 
sustainable over the long-term. While it is unclear exactly when the protests ended 
completely, it appears the intensity began to wane between three and four months after 
they started. As conventional social movement theory tells us, the rapid decline of a 
movement is typically the result of one of two things: either the movement's goal was 
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achieved or it has suffered from organizational problems (Della Porta & Diani, 1999). 
While one could make the argument that the anti-reservationist protesters achieved their 
goal, it is much more likely that the movement collapsed due to its inability to organize 
and its lack of structure and leadership. I will discuss the movement's success in a later 
section. 
Finally, this movement had no consistency in its use of protest tactics, and there 
was no change in repertoire. From the beginning of the protests, anti-reservationists 
employed a multitude of tactics. Some were peact~ful; most were violent; and, some 
began as peaceful but quickly became violent (Lahiri, 2008). The protesters used tactics 
such as demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, rioting, vandalism, and disruption of daily 
activity, to name a few. This was as true in the end as it was in the beginning. In fact, 
the only identifiable change to the movement's repertoire after Goswami's self-
immolation was more self-immolations. Due to the highly visible nature of self-
immolation, we cannot assume that others committed this act in order to emulate a prior 
self-immolation, not because of the direction or inl1uence from a central leadership. 
South Korea's prodemocracy movement, on the other hand, had a sharp increase 
in "the number of protest events by general activists" between 1987 and 1991, with only 
a slight dip in 1990 (Shin, et al., 2007, p. 45). As Shin and colleagues (2007) point out, 
by the mid-1980s groups such as students, laborers, and those opposed to American 
"imperialism" were finding a common cause under which to unify: democratic reform. 
Now, it is admittedly difficult to say for certain whether or not this increase in general 
activism represents an actual increase in the number of activists. It is quite possible that 
this increase is simply a reflection of a multitude of groups coming together under one 
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flag. It might also be some combination of the two. What is interesting, however, is that, 
regardless of which is correct, there is evidence of increased core mobilization: in raw 
participant numbers, in greater organizational structure, or both. While Shin et ai. do not 
directly address the number of activists (as opposed to total number of participants) they 
do point out that "in 1987 the number of individuals participating in protest events 
reaches a high of over 6 million participants" (Shin, et aI., 2007, p. 10). Regarding 
greater organizational structure, the authors point out that this trend "demonstrates not 
only the rise of coalition organizations but also inc:reasing solidarity and strength of the 
social movement sector" (Shin, et aI., 2007, p. 45). 
The prodemocracy movement also differed from its Indian counterpart in its 
sustainability. The movement in total lasted well over a decade. Even if we dismiss the 
years in which the movement was largely donnant, it was still very active for four years. 
Furthennore, not only did the movement survive for several years under an authoritarian 
regime, it was able to thrive when opportunity opened. Additionally, the prodemocracy 
movement continued for several years following the country's first democratic elections 
in order to advocate for further refonns (S. Kim, 2012). 
Finally, there were notable changes in the protest tactics that were used following 
the initial self-immolations. While it is worth noting that the first self-immolations in 
1987 and 1991 sparked repeat occurrences during those years, this is not the most 
important point. What is important is that the types of protest tactics used before 1987 
were mostly "non-disruptive," such as petitions, public statements, debates, propaganda, 
and the like (Shin, et aI., 2007, p. 12). From 1987 until 1992, the tactics of choice were 
"disruptive," which include conventional fonns of protest such as strikes, sit-ins, and 
53 
public demonstrations, as well as violent manifestations such as riots, vandalism, the 
taking of hostages, and self-immolations (Shin, et aI., 2007, p. 12). 
Mobilization of the Periphery 
In addition to mobilizing the core base of support, it is optimal for a movement to 
engage the general public. While the core is essential to the fundamental operations and 
advancement of the movement's agenda, the periphery can potentially provide both 
logistical and moral support for the movement. In addition, an engaged periphery can be 
an extremely potent political force, particularly in democratic systems because the public 
can exert significant electoral pressure on those in power. A sympathetic periphery can 
often mean the difference between a movement's success and failure. 
In India, participation in the anti-reservation movement was almost exclusively 
confined to higher caste students of urban universities. There appears to be little direct 
involvement in the movement by the general public. Recounting the structure ofthe 
movement, we can see that it was almost entirely comprised of preexisting student 
organizations. And, although there was a slight escalation of protest frequency in the first 
couple of weeks, the frequency and intensity of the movement quickly plateaued, 
remaining relatively constant until the end (Lahiri, 2008). This plateau occurred several 
weeks before the first instance of self-immolation. Thus, in terms of direct participation 
in protest activities, we can infer that, like core mobilization, self-immolation had 
virtually no impact on the periphery's inclination to directly support the movement 
through collective action. The only exception appears to be an instance in Uttar Pradesh 
in which thousands of rural residents "some armed with spears and sticks," flooded into 
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the streets of New Delhi "to back the student-led rally" ("Thousands Pour into Delhi in 
Jobs Protest," 1990) This isolated infusion of public support occurred just days after the 
first instance of self-immolation. 
However, despite the minimal effects on direct participation, there does appear to 
be a shift in higher caste public perception of the coalition government following the 
beginning ofthe wave, particularly in the urban areas where the vast majority of self-
immolations took place. As it turns out, the coalition Janata Party was widely supported 
across caste and geographic lines prior to the reservation announcement (Lahiri, 2008). 
Although there may have been those among the upper caste public who opposed the 
government's proposed action, even when the protests began, there is no evidence to 
suggest that this segment ofIndia's population was prepared to speak out. However, 
following the first self-immolation, public outrage, particularly in the urban areas of 
Northeast India, began to surface. For instance, nt~wspapers started publishing articles 
demonizing the Singh Government, and affirming its culpability for the chaos and death 
that occurred (Brown, 1990). Furthermore, many of these articles "portray the dead and 
the maimed as heroes" (Brown, 1990). Moreover, many in these areas begin displaying 
anti-Singh propaganda, calling for an procedural remedy (T. Singh, 1990). Finally, there 
is political evidence to suggest that a shift in public opinion occurred. Prior to the self-
immolations, Singh's cabinet remained unified and committed to the implementation of 
the reservation policy. But, after the self-immolations began, much of the cabinet 
engaged in a political mutiny, continually calling for Singh's resignation (Akiyama, 
1990), which they eventually received after Singh lost a confidence vote (Heitzman & 
Worden, 1995). A political panic of this nature and magnitude suggests only one thing: 
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there was a significant shift in the public opinion among a large portion of the electorate, 
and the politicians knew it. 
While mobilization of the periphery in India was largely confined to instances of 
political expression and legitimate procedural means, by the late 1980s the periphery in 
South Korea was highly mobilized and engaged in direct challenge to the government 
through protest activities. Prior to 1986, students and activists constituted the vast 
majority of the ranks of the prodemocracy movement (Shin, et aI., 2007). However, by 
early 1987, it had transformed from a movement once driven and sustained by 
professional activists and intelligentsia, into a truly popular movement. The struggle for 
democratic reform had unquestionably become part of the mainstream. In fact, citizen 
participation in protest events had increased approximately ten fold between 1986 and 
1987 (Shin, et al., 2007). In other words, ordinary citizens, from all walks of life and 
from all over the country, were now directly participating in the struggle for democratic 
reform. 
This enormous influx of popular support carried with it significant implications 
for the movement's success. First, it increased the ability ofthe movement to execute 
protest events on a massive scale~ Second, It lent the movement popular credibility. 
With the backing of a significant portion of the Korean public, the government could no 
longer ignore the demands of the movement without placing its own survival in jeopardy. 
Shin and authors describe the general public's participation in the movement as follows: 
The first peak [of public participation] was in the June democracy 
movement in 1987. Citizens' participation was especially important for 
the struggle because it meant that the large-scale demonstrations could be 
supported and justified by ordinary people, which in tum seriously 
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de legitimized the regime. The main supports of protest had traditionally 
been workers and students, but ordinary citizens including the middle 
class began to join the democracy movement. We can see an expansion of 
the democracy movement into every comer of Korean society, which was 
not confined to a small number of activist groups anymore. Mass 
participation was the key in bringing about constitutional reform after the 
June democracy movement (Shin, et aI., 2007, p. 46). 
What is interesting is that the increase in periphery mobilization does not coincide 
with the rise of democratic activism. Instead, it spikes shortly after the first self-
immolations in late 1985 and throughout 1986. For years, the general public showed 
little interest in participating in a push for democratic reform. This is most likely because 
economic and political conditions were far better than they had been in decades. First of 
all, the Chun regime, although not democratically dected, was far less repressive than 
regimes of the past. Second, South Korea had recently experienced remarkable economic 
success due to rapid industrialization. This led to a considerable improvement in quality 
of life and the emergence of a large middle class. As a consequence, many had become 
satisfied and therefore politically apathetic. 
Political Change 
So far, I have demonstrated that in terms of self-immolation's effects on core 
mobilization, South Korea's prodemocracy movement was far more mobilized, not only 
in number of protesters and frequency of events, but also in its degree of organization, 
than India's anti-reservation movement. Similarly, the periphery in South Korea was 
more directly engaged with the activities of the movement, although there is evidence to 
suggest some indirect periphery mobilization in India. So, what were the political 
consequences of self-immolation in these two cases? 
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When the anti-reservation protests began following the announcement of the 
enforcement of the MandaI recommendations, it was evident that the Singh government 
had no intention of reversing its stance. Up until the first case of self-immolation, Singh 
continually made comments that alluded to his commitment to follow through with 
reservations. For example, he is quoted as stating, "The goal of my Government is to 
provide social justice and not to deprive anyone of employment opportunities .. .1 am 
prepared to take any step consistent with the basic need for social justice" (Hazarika, 
1990). Singh's position remained consistent in the face ofthe violence, disorder, injury, 
and death that occurred in the first several weeks of the protests. However, following the 
self-immolations, the government began to show signs that its resolve was weakening. 
For instance, Singh extended an invitation to the protesters to open discussion on the 
issue stating, "Only through a dialogue can we learn the extent of their fears, dispel those 
that are unjustified and find ways of meeting those that have substance" (Bhaumik, 
1990). 
It is unclear whether this change was the result of an emotional impact of the 
suicides, or fear of a political backlash that was be(:oming a clear and present danger to 
the regime, as the country was being ripped apart by conflict. Whatever the motivations, 
the results are clear. As the number of self-immolations continued to escalate, the ruling 
government was becoming more and more unstable, ultimately devolving into political 
cannibalism. Singh was not only a target of blame by protesters, the public, and the 
opposition Congress, he was also offered up as a scapegoat by his own cabinet. Although 
he dodged political demise on multiple occasions, Singh finally succumbed to a vote of 
no confidence on November 7, 1990 (Heitzman & Worden, 1995). Furthermore, the 
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Janata coalition lost control in the subsequent election. As we have seen, although the 
reservation policy was put on hold, it was eventually implemented anyway without 
incident (Heitzman & Worden, 1995). 
This raises the question as to whether or not the anti-reservation movement and 
violent tactics such as self-immolation were actually effective at all. Lahiri argues that 
self-immolation was not effective because it failed to arouse feelings of shame and fear 
from the government (Lahiri, 2008). However, I contend that self-immolation was in fact 
marginally politically effective, although only in the short-term. This can be seen by the 
fact that the government began to give ground in the struggle by extending opportunities 
for discussion to the protesters. Additionally, the Supreme Court offered a ruling which 
temporarily placed an injunction on the implementation of the policy (Sharma, 2005). 
Next, it caused a political disaster for the Singh regime, creating rifts in the party, even 
among supporters of reservation, largely based on the handling of the protests. This in 
tum significantly inhibited the regime's ability to function effectively. Finally, the public 
largely reversed its support ofthe ruling Janata coalition, voting it out of power in the 
subsequent elections. Self-immolation ultimately failed, however, because it was unable 
to cultivate a unified identity under which the movement could coalesce. In fact, it is 
quite possible that this failure, combined with the high intensity ofthe protests, actually 
caused the movement to prematurely collapse because of emotional fatigue. 
While the political consequences of self-immolation in India were moderate and 
short-term, they were extensive and lasting in South Korea. Prior to the beginnings of the 
self-immolations, the influence ofthe prodemocracy movement was unclear. On the one 
hand, Chun exercised strict control over the activities of his institutional opposition, and 
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those who had previously held political office, while simultaneously opposing popular 
elections. At the same time, however, he significantly decreased restrictions on non-
institutional political activity, demonstrated by his campaign to release political 
dissidents from prison, and toleration for discussion of constitutional reform (S. Kim, 
2012). However, in retrospect, it is clear that thes~~ ostensibly conciliatory measures were 
nothing more than means of appeasement for the opposition. It is likely that Chun, in a 
display of short-sighted judgment, saw no danger in releasing the political prisoners. 
And, as we now know, he later cracked down on discourse related to constitutional 
reform, a decision that ultimately led to his fall from power. 
After the self-immolations started and the prodemocracy movement began to 
mobilize, elites collectively decided that in order to ensure stability, the unelected Chun 
should step down from power, a suggestion to which he reluctantly agreed (S. Kim, 
2012). But, again, this was not intended to be a step toward democracy. The intention of 
the political elites was merely to place Roh Tae Woo in power, another authoritarian 
leader who was not the subject of widespread public anger. Much to the surprise of the 
elites, however, Roh announced his commitment to democratic elections (S. Kim, 2012). 
Although it is unclear whether this announcement was an empty promise aimed at 
neutralizing the momentum of the prodemocracy movement, the extent to which the core 
and periphery had already mobilized, coupled with the continued instances of self-
immolation, virtually guaranteed that Roh would have to follow through on his 
commitment, which he ultimately did, resulting in the democratic elections of 1987. 
In sum, the evidence suggests that self-immolation had varying degrees of success 
at mobilization and political change in these two cases. In India, mobilization efficacy 
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was largely confined to the periphery, and was modest at best. Self-immolation had no 
notable impact on the anti-reservation movement's ability to increase its core support 
base or to organize the existing participants into a viable and coherent entity of extra-
institutional political change. However, the modest mobilization of the periphery 
consequently had a modest impact on the political environment. In South Korea, self-
immolation had considerable effects in all areas. Following the first acts, there was a 
steady increase in the number of participants, both activists and citizens, as well as 
frequency of protest events. South Korea's prodemocracy movement became remarkably 




To briefly recount, I have shown that these two movements occurred in 
moderately open socio-political systems, and that they both experienced mass epidemics 
of self-immolations. I have also demonstrated that there were substantial differences in 
the efficacy of self-immolation as an impetus for core and periphery mobilization and 
political change. But, what can account for such radically divergent outcomes? The first 
logical place to look would be at each country's civil society. But, as it turns out, at the 
time of the self-immolations, India and South Korea had both developed vibrant civil 
societies (Heitzman & Worden, 1995; Savada & Shaw, 1990). Are there any other 
factors that might minimize or enhance the efficacy of self-immolation as a tactic of 
political protest? If so, how would they reconcile with the two cases presented here? In 
this chapter, I look at several variables, including social stratification, political culture, 
issue diffusion, and institutional access, and argue that differences in these factors can 
have an impact on the efficacy of self-immolation. 
The first factor that I will discuss is the structure of the social system, namely the 
degree of stratification or integration. When a society is stratified, and a movement 
overlaps social divisions, it less likely that self-immolation will have any effect on 
mobilization. This is because in a stratified society, inequality tends to be prevalent, 
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group identity is inherently more entrenched, and thus social divisions are more 
pronounced. Therefore, social stratification inevitably creates a more contentious socio-
political environment. The result is less cooperation, which is fundamentally counter to 
the potential success of any form of collective action. It is important to note, however, 
that a stratified society is not necessarily synonymous with ethnic heterogeneity, although 
the two frequently coincide. It is possible to have an ethnically homogenous, yet 
simultaneously stratified community. One might consider the example of China, which is 
about as close to ethnically homogenous as is possible in the modem globalized world. 
With Han Chinese making up 91.5 percent of the population, China suffers from 
significant social and political instability due to rifts in the social system (cia.gov). Even 
when we discount cultural factors such as religion in China, we are still left with a 
remarkably high level of economic inequality, particularly along geographic lines. This 
is especially prevalent in the rural/urban divide, arld the extent to which certain social 
groups are limited in their mobility potential (i.e. education and employment). 
Too often, when scholars observe collective action phenomena, they tend to 
assume the existence of a common identity based on the shared objective of the group. 
However, in many cases, a common objective on its own is not sufficient for the 
development of a collective identity; instead there must first be at least the potential for 
the development of a common social identity based on mutual respect among those 
seeking to advance the objective. Let us now look at each case through the lens of social 
stratification. 
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In India, social fragmentation had disastrous effects on the ability of the anti-
reservation movement to organize, much less execute an effective strategy. This limited 
the ability of the movement to achieve anything other than marginal success, and 
rendered it unsustainable over the long-term. As we have seen, this movement was made 
up primarily of students from higher castes and classes who opposed to the government's 
plan to reserve jobs for lower castes and classes. When looking at the movement in terms 
of the policy itself, the natural inclination is to simply divide the actors into two 
categories: opponents and proponents. However, we do a disservice to this study if we 
stop short at such a superficial analysis. We must go further by diligently accounting for 
the social, not just the political, make-up of the movement. While it is convenient for the 
observer to indiscriminately apply the term "higher castes," in doing so we lose sight of 
the fact that this movement was made up of extremely different social groups with little 
in common other than mutual disdain for a policy. To elaborate, it is essential to 
understand that the anti-reservation movement actually consisted of three distinct castes, 
and a countless number of classes. And, as history has shown us time and again, deeply 
entrenched social divisions do not easily conform to changing political dynamics. In fact, 
the multi-level social stratification means that animosity almost certainly existed within 
the movement itself. 
Having a look at the structure and organization of the anti-reservation movement 
will help to illustrate this point. As it turns out, this movement had no identifiable 
organization, and its structure was more linear than hierarchical. This is evidenced by 
three consistent and interrelated factors. First, the anti-reservation movement had no 
discernible central leadership. As Lahiri points out, the movement was comprised of 
64 
countless unaffiliated student organizations, and none of them emerged in a leadership 
role (Lahiri, 2008). Second, the movement exhibited no consensus on strategy or 
coordinated application of protest tactics. While some groups exercised moderation, 
others adopted a more extreme approach, with an inclination toward violence (Lahiri, 
2008). Finally, the movement demonstrated limited cultivation of social networks or 
lines of communication. Instead, each group chos(~ to largely operate independently 
(Lahiri, 2008). Combined, these three factors reinforce Lahiri' s description, that it was 
"an ad hoc movement, created solely to fight the adoption of Mandai into state policy. It 
is more correct to view the Anti-reservation movement as a loose confederation of a 
variety of caste-based student organizations" (Lahiri, 2008, p. 185). In other words, these 
were groups organized on the principle of caste differentiation and exclusion, principles 
inherently not conducive to cooperation. The implication is that, while fighting to stop 
the policy was clearly important to all protest groups, it was less important than bridging 
social divides. The overall structure and lack of organization of the anti-reservation 
movement suggests that the student groups involved had no intention of cooperating with 
one another. But, why is that? It seems common sense that groups that unite, organize, 
and cooperate are more effective than those that do not. In fact, the anti-reservation 
movement emerged as a spontaneous amalgamation of dissident groups and student 
organizations acting simultaneously yet almost independently in pursuit of a common 
goal. According to Lahiri, "The creation of a single organization or even a strong 
coalition of groups was hindered by caste, class, and political divisions, many of which 
were replicated within the number and variety of student organizations working against 
MandaI" (Lahiri, 2008, p. 187). 
65 
Furthermore, while the lack of organization in the beginning of a social 
movement does not necessarily preclude future organization or cooperation, one aspect of 
Lahiri's description is telling in light of what we know about the social dynamics in 
India. The fact that the movement did not operate as a cohesive unit, but rather as an 
assorted bunch of organizations based on caste identity suggests that, while they all 
shared a commitment to the anti-reservation cause, the deeply entrenched social hierarchy 
condemned the movement to factionalization, and ultimately little chance of collective 
success or movement sustainability. Ironically, the: very social cleavages that pitted the 
protester against the prospective beneficiaries of the reservation policy were the same 
cleavages that ensured the movement's failure. Thus, the wave of self-immolations was 
largely ineffective at mobilization, not necessarily because of the act itself, but because 
no mobilization tactic, no matter how powerful was likely to overcome the depth of 
caste-based social division. 
Unlike India's clearly defined and historically and culturally embedded social 
structure, there is far less distinction between classes in South Korea. In fact, South 
Korea actually enjoys a great deal social cohesion (md equality. First, South Korea is 
very much a homogenous society. South Korean's share a common language, history, 
cultural identity, and ethnicity (with the exception of approximately 20,000 Chinese) 
(cia.gov). Furthermore, the economic boom during South Korea's transition to a modem 
industrial economy facilitated the emergence of a large middle class and a high standard 
ofliving, relative to the rest of the world (S. Kim, 2012). As a result, there are far fewer 
sources of contention among social groups, making it more likely for citizens to 
cooperate with one another when faced a struggle for a common objective. The history 
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of collective action in South Korea overwhelmingly supports this point. In fact, popular 
mobilization is one of the defining traits of modem South Korean history, and its society 
is one of the most effective mobilizing machines in the world (Lee, 2007). 
This is also evident in the structure and organization of the prodemocracy 
movement. The movement was comprised of groups and organizations which focused on 
a variety of issues ranging from workers' rights, to anti-US "imperialism" (Shin, et aI., 
2007). Despite their differences, all of these groups united in the struggle for democratic 
reform. Furthermore, the movement quickly developed a central leadership hierarchy, 
and demonstrated a remarkable ability to organize and execute a consistent strategy 
(Shin, et aI., 2007). In short, the strategy and composition of the movement largely 
echoed the highly communitarian and egalitarian social dynamics of South Korea. 
Another factor to consider in the mobilization of the core (and is also applicable 
to the mobilization of the periphery) is the nature of political culture. Political culture in 
both South Korea and India is closely related to the historical and cultural social dynamic 
in each country. In India, there exists a political culture of contention between those who 
value historical traditions and those who wish to pursue a system based on modem social 
and political values (McCormick, 2004). Given the interests inherent in these two 
opposing beliefs, contention is often divided along caste and geographic lines. 
McCormick points out that frustration is endemic to India's political culture, and that 
"Political, social, and religious conflicts regularly lead to physical violence" 
(McCormick, 2004, p. 347). Conversely, South Korean political culture values the good 
of the community as a whole over the good of indi vidual groups. As a consequence, 
conflict is typically between society and the political system rather than within society 
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itself. A product of this socio-political dynamic was the development of the minjung 
ideology (Lee, 2007). According to Lee, minjung "meaning 'common people' as 
opposed to elites and leaders ... came to signify those who are oppressed in the socio-
political system but who are capable of rising up against it" (Lee, 2007, p. 5) Although 
Lee points out that elites often included intellectuals, the minjung ideology was actually 
cultivated by students and academics. Minjung became a powerful ideology, and most 
students were subject to indoctrination early in their academic experience. Fundamental 
to minjung ideology is a devotion to activism, and a willingness to sacrifice one's self for 
the cause (whatever the cause of the day happens to be) (Lee, 2007). 
The diffusion of the issue and its importance is also fundamental to the efficacy of 
self-immolation. Clearly, the more people who identity an issue as important to their 
own well-being or the well-being of those with whom they share an emotional 
connection, the more likely the movement will attract supporters. At first glance, the 
reservation policy would seem to impact a substantial segment of the Indian population. 
If we look at issue diffusion in terms of caste percentages, we find that eligible 
beneficiaries of the policy total approximately 52 percent of the population. Thus, the 
issue of anti-reservation should be important to roughly half of India's population (or 
about 400 million at the time of the protests). However, this statistic is misleading. In 
actuality, the anti-reservation issue had a relatively low level of diffusion throughout 
Indian society. The reason is that we need to separate those of the higher castes and 
classes into two categories. First, there are those who could expect to experience the 
practical impacts of reservation, specifically those who were about to enter the 
workforce. This would primarily include university students, consequently the group that 
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almost exclusively filled the ranks of the protests. These individuals opposed the policy 
for both practical and ideological reasons. The second group would include the 
remainder of higher caste members, most of whom were already employed. For these 
individuals, opposition would likely be solely ideological. We can therefore conclude 
that the issue was not nearly as pervasive as one would expect. 
The events that transpired support this conclusion. While it is unclear exactly 
how many individuals participated in the movement, it is safe to say that only a small 
fraction of the higher castes took to the streets. If ideological opposition was sufficient to 
attract direct support of the movement, the streets of India would have been flooded with 
nearly half a billion people, an event that the world would certainly have noticed. 
However, this did not happen. The fact is that, while there were isolated instances of 
protesters who participated for strictly ideological reasons, the vast majority were those 
who were facing the adverse, practical consequences of the policy. However, as we have 
seen, this did not completely prevent the periphery from taking part, but they chose an 
indirect, less confrontational means of participation. 
In South Korea, there was a much higher le:vel of issue diffusion, given that 
democratic reform is what Mancur Olson would refer to as a "public good," in the sense 
that it cannot be denied to some and granted to others (Olson, 1965). Thus, democratic 
reform held practical implications for everyone. What is interesting is the importance of 
the issue for the periphery seems to have changed between 1987 and 1991. In 1987, the 
importance of democratic reform was high among most of the South Korean population. 
However, by 1991, institutional democracy was already in place, and the movement that 
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continued to push for further constitutional reforms was in decline and unable draw 
support beyond the activist community (Shin, et aI., 2007). 
The final factor that impacts the efficacy of self-immolation is the accessibility of 
the institutional political process. When institutional mechanisms exist through which 
political change can be attained, extreme forms of protest like self-immolation are much 
less effective. Efficacy increases as institutional access decreases. The reason is that, in 
accessible political systems, extreme acts of protest appear as irrational acts of mentally 
disturbed individuals. Conversely, when access is limited or non-existent, extreme fomls 
of protest are more accepted because they are considered to be acts of the desperate, 
allowing observers to identity, or at the very least sympathize, with the protester. 
India's political system at the time of the anti-reservation movement could be 
considered at least moderately accessible, especially to those of the higher castes and 
classes. Although competition in the Indian electoral system was limited, the country did 
hold regularly scheduled, free and fair elections. And, as we have seen, the modest 
changes that occurred were achieved almost exclusively through procedural avenues. 
South Korea, on the other hand, was still a non-democratic political system when the self-
immolations began, allowing more people to justify the act as reasonable, and even 
necessary. Therefore, political change occurred primarily as a means of maintaining 
social and political stability. In other words, it was an act of national self-preservation. 
In short, the efficacy of self-immolation is dependent upon a number of socio-
political variables. In moderately open countries with stratified social structures, self-
immolation tends to be less effective at mobilizing the core base of support and general 
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public because of preexisting social cleavages. This is because of the inherent difficulty 
in cultivating a common identity in contentious socio-political environments. Similarly, 
political cultures that emphasize conflict over cooperation further diminish the 
mobilization efficacy of self-immolation because groups will be unable to overcome 
these social divisions. Furthermore, low levels of issue diffusion reduce the potential 
number of those who will be drawn to the cause, inhibiting the movement's strength. 
Finally, when there is at least moderate access to institutional mechanisms of political 
change, self-immolation is viewed as irrational act., reducing its effectiveness in eliciting 
the desired emotional response from the observer. The existence of any combinations of 






As self-immolation increasingly becomes a part of the protester's arsenal 
worldwide, it is fundamental that political scientists take this elaborate and extreme form 
of political participation seriously. We have seen that self-immolation can potentially 
have significant impacts on the interactive dynamics between the social and the political 
spheres. Its influence can range from very limited, resulting in little or no notable 
change, to moderately effective, prompting minimal changes in social and political 
behavior, to extremely effective, sparking mass mobilization and even complete shifts in 
political structures and power dynamics. 
This project has focused on the anti-reservation movement in India and the 
prodemocracy movement in South Korea. I chose these two cases for several reasons. 
First, they represent two of the highest frequencies of movement specific political self-
immolation in history. Second, they fit a particular socio-political profile: specifically, at 
the time of their respective movements, both India and South Korea were in the initial 
stages of opening their socio-political structures. While India was beginning to 
experience minimal electoral competition, South Korea was becoming less restrictive on 
social activity and communication. This presented socio-political opportunities for 
participation that had not existed previously. Finally, these two cases conveniently 
occurred at almost exactly the same time. This fact offered the unique advantage of 
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being able to confidently eliminate the possibility that exogenous factors were the cause 
of variance in the social and political outcomes. 
After conducting an analysis of the events that occurred prior to and after the 
initial self-immolations in both cases, several points became evident. In India, the self-
immolations had virtually no impact on core mobilization. There was no evidence of an 
increase in participation or organizational capacity following the self-immolations. 
Similarly, there were very limited effects on the direct mobilization of the periphery. 
However, the periphery did exhibit signs of moderate indirect mobilization in the form of 
propaganda and shifts in the electoral support of the incumbent regime. The political 
results were also moderate and only short-term. In South Korea, there was substantial 
evidence of both core and direct periphery mobilization. Not only did the number of 
activists and citizens involved in protests increase, the frequency of the events themselves 
spiked after the first self-immolations. Furthermore, the political impact was substantial, 
resulting in an institutional shift from autocratic to democratic rule. 
I attribute these disparities in outcomes to a number of socio-political variables. 
First, social stratification prevented self-immolation from being an effective mobilizing 
tool in India, while social integration facilitated its effectiveness in South Korea. These 
mobilization effects of self-immolation were further amplified by the political culture of 
contention in India and that of communitarianism in South Korea. In addition, the issue 
of anti-reservation was far less diffused than prodemocracy, thus limiting the power of 
self-immolation to draw people to action. Finally, self-immolation was less effective in 
India because there were institutional mechanism in place though which to initiate 
political change, diminishing the ability of the self-immolator to elicit an emotional 
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response or establish a connection with potential supporters. Combined, these factors 
necessarily have an indirect impact on the efficacy of self-immolation on political change 
because an increased capacity for mobilization translates to greater political influence. 
In conducting this research, there were obstacles and limitations that must be 
addressed. The first has to do with definitions and measurements. When dealing with 
concepts such as efficacy and openness in the social and political structures, there is an 
inherent problem of subjectivity. Because there is no universal understanding of these 
concepts, their meaning, even when accompanied by a conceptual or operational 
definition, is open to interpretation by the reader. Unfortunately this limitation carries 
over to measurement, and in turn, the corresponding conclusions. However, when 
dealing with topics such as the efficacy of self-immolation, these limitations are 
unavoidable. A second has to do with data and data collection. Because the study of 
self-immolation in still in its infancy, the data that are currently available are scattered 
and incomplete, at best. Thus, much of the data had to be extracted from qualitative 
accounts of the events. In researching South Korea's prodemocracy movement, I found 
that the academic community had fairly comprehensively chronicled these events. 
However, academic work on the anti-reservation movement was extremely limited. In 
dealing with the lack of scholarship in this area, I turned to newspaper accounts, a 
method that presented its own set of limitations. When searching newspaper databases, I 
was often presented with inconsistent results. Even attempts to replicate database 
searches of other scholars yielded inconsistencies. In the end, I drew articles from the 
LexisNexis database because it offered the most consistent and comprehensive search 
results. 
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Despite the limitations, this research has provided a new approach to the study of 
self-immolation. However, there is still much work that needs to be done. First and most 
important, with the number of self-immolations rapidly increasing, it is imperative that 
scholars begin to rigorously document and compile data on these events as they occur. 
Many details of past self-immolations have unfortunately been lost to history, likely to 
never be retrieved. But, there is hope for future research. If we begin to build a solid 
foundation of data now, future studies of self-immolation will be able to provide more 
conclusive findings to more specific questions. Future research should also focus on the 
efficacy of self-immolation in other types of socio-political systems. For example, how 
effective is self-immolation in open systems, such as the United States or countries of 
Western Europe? How about in closed systems, such as China or the countries of the 
Arab Spring? Another topic to explore is how the media impacts the efficacy of self-
immolation. On the one hand, it might be argued that the media is an arm of the 
powerful, and therefore is less likely to cover self-immolation because doing so would 
offer a voice to the powerless. An interesting fact uncovered in the course of this 
research was that, in the United States, a country with the fourth highest number of self-
immolations (Biggs, 2005), there was almost no mention of American occurrences by 
major news outlets or popular, non-academic websites. In fact, one recent (2012) self-
immolation in the United States was only addressed by a local independent news 
organization, and a page that had been devoted to the instance on the popular, user 
generated website Wikipedia had been inexplicably deleted. On the other hand, perhaps 
the media is more likely to cover self-immolation because of its extreme nature. This 
might be especially true in the modem age oftechnology if media is defined to include 
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social networking capabilities. Tools that allow instant documentation (i.e. cellular 
phone cameras) combined with social networking platforms (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, and 
Youtube) diminish the ability of corporate media organizations to control the flow of 
information. Finally, while I chose to focus on two cases with extremely high 
frequencies, there are many more cases with only a very small number of occurrences. 
Future research should look at whether or not the efficacy of self-immolation increases, 
decreases, or remains the same as the number of instances rises. In short, with more time 
and research, the scholarly community will be able to provide a greater understanding of 
this largely neglected socio-political phenomenon. 
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